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PREFACE
Many philosophers beat dead horses, because philo­
sophical horses, like cats, have nine lives.
My horse in this dissertation is the traditional, the 
"Cartesian,” concept of mind, which identifies mind with con­
sciousness. You may say: No one any longer identifies mind
with consciousness; the Freudian theory of mind, with its em­
phasis on unconscious mental states, released us from the 
spell of that identification. Nevertheless, it seems to me 
that we retain enough of our pre-Freudian way of thought to 
overrate the role and function of conscious mental states and 
to confuse thoroughly the distinction between conscious and 
unconscious mental states. We believe that consciousness and 
rational thought and introspection, intention and meaning and 
intelligence, lie on one side of the boundary, and that the 
unconscious, and irrationality and animal instincts, lie on 
the other. Not all of us believe all of this, but most of us 
often enough do— because this is what the popular imagination 
has done with its mixed heritage of Cartesian and Freudian 
theory. And a result of this heritage is that unless we are 
specifically considering conscious and unconscious mental
IV
States, we may lapse into saying things about conscious and 
unconscious states that reflect our popular prejudices. Such 
lapses— because of the power of our uncritical and usual way 
of thought and expression— account for the phoenix-like nature 
of that old war-horse, the Cartesian, or traditional, theory 
of mind.
In this dissertation, I use "Cartesian or traditional 
theory of mind" to refer to a philosophico-religious vision 
of man and mind that— if it does not altogether deny uncon­
scious mental states— gives to consciousness and reason the 
great role in man's mental life. Such a view renders much of 
our behavior oddly meaningless, as Freud clearly saw, and also 
it spawns a series of concepts and dilemmas that defy philo­
sophical analysis or solution, for example: the logical impos­
sibility of allowing us both introspective certainty and self- 
deception, the problem of knowledge of other minds, the uneasy 
relationship of intelligent animals and computers to men, the 
relationship of thoughts to words and speech, and so forth.
The traditional theory of mind, an appropriation by a 
layman mentality of an originally technical and philosophi­
cally rigorous theory, is not yet a dead horse. Nor is it a 
straw man. It is insidiously and tenaciously part of our way 
of thinking. Much of the reason for this is that a theory of 
mind involves us on several levels: We must be engaged with
the philosophical, the psychological, and the everyday con­
cepts of mind. As philosophers, we look for criteria for the
distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states; 
we look for the reasons for our saying in one case, "Uncon­
sciously you envy him" and yet in another, "It's only that 
you think he's mediocre; it's not envy coloring your judg­
ment— it's good taste." We study both our philosophical and 
our ordinary, everyday use of certain quasi-technical terms, 
like "introspection" and "awareness," to see if our use is 
ambiguous; and if it is, we analyze that ambiguity in order 
to make new and better distinctions between, and new uses of, 
the terms. We look to our knowledge of psychology for the 
reasons why this state is unconscious and that state is con­
scious; we look to psychology to inform us of the "forces" at 
work in our minds. A subject that engages us at these points—  
philosophical, psychological, and everyday— will have its share 
of supposedly dead horses littering the path. That this is so 
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My dissertation is a look at our use of certain psy­
chological concepts. I analyze these concepts and suggest 
some restrictions of our usual use of the terms "awareness," 
"introspection," and "thought." I argue that these restric­
tions illuminate the relation of conscious to unconscious men­
tal states in such a way as to give us a basis on which cor­
rectly to distinguish them. This basis involves speech and a 
kind of awareness, not thought or intelligence or rationality, 
and results in our relegating conscious mental states to a 
rather small, specialized role in our mental life.
Freud says that in order to explain human behavior, 
you must assume that unconscious states exist. Further, you 
must assume that they are mental. These states are distin­
guished from conscious states by our not being aware of them. 
This is the primary fact about unconscious states; we must 
assume them because people act as if such states are oper­
ating, yet they deny them because they are not aware of them. 
But we cannot assume that there are major differences between 
conscious and unconscious states other than awareness, for
the concept of unconscious mental states loses its explana­
tory value if unconscious mental states are not seen as (some­
times) purposeful, intelligent, appropriate, elaborate, inten­
tional, that is, full-fledged mental states.
You can do a lot without explicitly recognizing that 
you are doing it. You can follow directions and you can "sud­
denly" solve problems, all without any explicit thought about 
what you are doing; you say in such cases that the thinking 
was unconscious. Much of human behavior conforms to this pat- 
term; most of the time we are not, after all, consciously 
thinking about what we are doing. Yet if traditional philos­
ophy were correct, we would be thinking explicitly and con­
sciously of what we are doing most or all of the time.
Consistent with this reduction of the role of con­
sciousness is a distinction between the kinds of awareness we 
exhibit of our activities and states. There is the awareness 
we show when we maneuver correctly in traffic, and there is 
the kind we show when we take explicit verbal note of a state, 
or avow or admit a state. The first kind is sufficient to ac­
count for the larger part of our behavior and is related to 
unconsciously controlled activity. The second kind of aware­
ness is limited of course to language-users, and not coinci­
dentally, only language-users are considered conscious beings, 
i.e., capable of having (conscious) mental states.
Traditional philosophy failed to fully recognize un­
conscious mental activity, because traditional philosophy of
mind took the fact of consciousness as its starting point. 
Traditional theories saw that only human beings can be explic­
itly aware of their mental activities and reasoned from there 
that such awareness constitutes the difference between human 
beings and other animals. And this is so. But I claim that 
such awareness is a linguistic phenomenon: only if you can 
talk can you have such awareness. Speech, not rational 
thought, is the primary fact of consciousness.
The old concepts of traditional philosophy of mind 
can be reinterpreted to conform to this rearrangement of pri­
orities. Introspection and incorrigibility and rational 
thought can be viewed as linguistic; and viewing them this 
way provides support for the basically correct Freudian theory 
of conscious and unconscious mental states. Further, exami­
nation of such new phenomena as split-brain patients and lan- 
guage-using apes reinforces the model of mind— of conscious 
and unconscious mental states distinguished on the basis of 
speech— that I espouse.




Traditional thought holds that the mind of a human 
being essentially is conscious, and further that conscious­
ness essentially involves thinking and reasoning, and is in­
telligent and purposeful. This view holds that when we act, 
we do so in response to or in accord with our consciously 
claimed beliefs and desires and purposes. Further, this line 
of thought sees the unconscious as a result of the "animal 
side" of our nature, and while sometimes we believe that ani­
mals are "thinking" this or that, nevertheless the unconscious 
part of our mental life is not truly mental in the way that 
our "higher," conscious part is; Unconscious states are not 
intelligent, they are not purposeful, they do not involve rea­
soning. They are instinctual and physiological. We do not 
"mean" something when we behave in accordance with unconscious 
desires in the way we "mean" something when we behave in
accordance with our conscious desires. Unconscious states 
are not as "important” as conscious states to our mental life 
and behavior.
But Freud's theory of mind emphasizes the importance 
of unconscious states in our mental life. Freud wants to per­
suade us that our unconscious states must be as legitimately 
mental as our conscious states, that they must involve all the 
characteristics heretofore identified with consciousness alone. 
Freud claims that the main difference between conscious and 
unconscious states is that we are aware of the former and un­
aware of the latter. He claims that seeing the distinction in 
such terms makes better sense of human behavior than seeing 
the distinction in terras such as intelligence and meaningful­
ness. I jgree with Freud here; the distinction that eventually 
I draw between conscious and unconscious states is rooted in 
Freud's.
The Need for Postulating Unconscious Mental States
As Freud saw it, his first task was to make the exis­
tence of meaningful unconscious mental states plausible— and 
he did so by arguing the stronger claim that such states are 
necessary.
Freud's argument goes like this : Because we are aware
only of our conscious mental states, consciousness seems omni­
present, leaving little or- no place for unconscious states.
What we are aware of at any moment crowds out anything else; 
conscious states are ubiquitous. But this seeming ubiquity is
deceptive, for actually consciousness is riddled with gaps.
The gaps are omissions of meaning, and become obvious when 
we search for explanations for behavior that we find inex­
plicable. Such behavior can be as trivial and as seemingly 
meaningless as slips of the tongue in a generally healthy 
person or as disruptive and puzzling as obsessive-compulsive 
rituals in a severely neurotic person. On Freud's theory, 
when we observe seemingly senseless behavior in someone, we 
can appeal to mental states that the person is not aware of 
and yet which motivate and explain his behavior.
The gap argument claims that, in order to make sense 
of actions that otherwise do not make good sense, it is neces­
sary to suppose that we have states of which we are not aware; 
and these states must be mental, for they fill gaps in a men­
tal continuum. Furthermore, only mental phenomena can give 
sense or meaning, a reason, for what, seems to be senseless 
behavior. The gap argument shows that only phenomena that 
are unconscious and mental can account for the gaps in mean­
ing in our behavior. A view, like the traditional theory of 
mind, that identifies mind with consciousness cannot account 
for those gaps. And while the traditional view seems more 
plausible because of the ubiquitous nature of conscious men­
tal states, it cannot offer an explanation for much of our 
behavior; the traditional view renders many of our actions 
meaningless. Surely, says Freud, the more plausible theory 
is the one that assumes from the start that our behavior is
essentially meaningful, purposeful, of a whole.
An example of the necessity of assuming such uncon­
scious states occurs when we look to our conscious beliefs 
and wants for the reason for an action, and our conscious 
beliefs and wants cannot give us a sufficient reason. For 
example, I quit my job and apply for another. I am a com­
mercial artist and I want to be successful in my field: I
want to make a certain amount of money at my job and I want 
to be well regarded by my peers. I believe that working for 
the best advertising agency in the state will help me to 
achieve those goals. My conscious wants and beliefs in this 
case would seem sufficient to account for my decision to 
change jobs. Yet I have held my present low-paying unchal- 
lenging job in a small agency for ten years, and for all 
that time I have wanted to be successful and have believed 
that working for a better agency would make me more success­
ful. I was not prevented from changing jobs by the belief 
that I had no chance of being hired by a better agency than 
mine— in fact, I was approached only last year by one but 
turned down the offer. Through the years, I have always 
found some reason or other for not changing jobs. You now 
see that none of these reasons was really sufficient to war­
rant my staying with my unfulfilling job— just as my reasons 
for now changing jobs are not sufficient. For I cannot tell 
you why, suddenly, I am acting on the wants and beliefs that 
I have had all along and that were never before sufficient
to prompt me into action. The only reasons I can give you 
are that I think I will be more successful if I go to another 
agency. It occurs to you that my boss's son, with whom I 
worked, left the agency six months ago. (This has not oc­
curred to me in connection with my leaving.) It further oc­
curs to you that I was very attached to the young man, and 
that perhaps my real, unconscious reason for quitting is that 
I no longer have the emotional investment in the agency that 
evidently was sufficient to hold me there against my con­
scious wants and beliefs.
The Differences Between Conscious and Unconscious 
Mental States; How Unconscious States 
Become Conscious 
Freud uses the gap argument to support his rather 
modest claim that the mental has both conscious and uncon­
scious processes. But he also uses it as an opening wedge 
in his drive to show what conscious and unconscious states 
are like and how they differ. Freud usually uses the gap 
argument to set the stage for his distinction between pre- 
conscious, or merely latently unconscious, mental states, 
and properly unconscious mental states.^ He persuades us 
first that unless we accept unconscious mental states— i.e., 
mental states of which we are not aware— as full-fledged 
mental processes, we cannot account wholly for our behavior; 
and then he distinguishes between the two types of uncon­
scious state. Preconscious (Pcs.) states differ from
conscious (Cs.) states only in that we are not aware of them, 
and we are quite willing to accept these, for in accepting 
them, we get such a large return and give up really very 
little of our everyday conceptions of mind. But now Freud 
wants us to accept the concept of properly unconscious (Ucs.) 
mental states, which have several characteristics that are 
at odds with the characteristics of Cs. and Pcs. mental 
states. These characteristics of Ucs. mental states are; 
exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mo­
bility of cathexis), timelessness, and replacement of exter-
2nal by psychical reality.
In the unconscious, mutually contradictory mental 
states are tolerated and exist side by side, in contrast to 
consciousness, where the contradictions we find somehow must 
be reconciled. Consciousness cannot tolerate the entertain­
ing of contradictory ideas : When we hear someone proclaiming
beliefs or wishes that are opposed or inconsistent, we think 
him a fool; yet, says Freud, we all have in our unconscious 
unreconcilable ideas. The "timelessness" of Ucs. mental 
states is their unyielding persistence through time in spite 
of the obvious changes that mark a person's mental develop­
ment; without being aware of such states, we act upon ideas 
that are infantile and untouched by our maturing experiences 
in life. Ucs. mental states work in response to the princi­
ple of pleasure, not to the demands of an outer, consciously 
perceived reality.
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Unconscious, "cathected" ideas are invested with 
psychical "energy," and uninhibitedly tend toward "discharge" 
in consciousness. But, given their character, many uncon­
scious ideas are unacceptable to consciousness, so that the 
PCS., which acts as a censor for consciousness, turns them 
back. The way that such ideas finally become conscious is 
by surrendering their cathexis, or energy, to acceptable—  
and associated— ideas which get past the censor.
Let me explain this in more detail. The following 
three questions are the same: "How do unconscious states be­
come conscious?" "How is an unconscious state transformed 
into a conscious state?" "How do I become aware of an uncon­
scious mental state?"
Freud likens consciousness to perception; he says 
that becoming aware of our unconscious states is like per-
3ceiving the external world through our sense organs. An 
unconscious state cannot become conscious until it is per­
ceived by consciousness; and it must "attract" perception, 
draw attention to itself. One way an unconscious state at­
tracts perception is through the heightening of cathexis 
which causes a need for discharge (and which I described 
briefly above). This need for discharge is called the 
"pleasure principle" because an unconscious mental state 
that reaches a certain intensity of cathexis is 
uncomfortable.^
The second and more "sophisticated" method by which
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a mental state can reach consciousness is found by looking 
at the functioning of the system Pcs. The system Pcs. is 
the psychical system that consists of latently unconscious 
mental states, i.e., those states that can pass easily in 
and out of consciousness. The reason for the facility with 
which a Pcs. mental state can become conscious is that Pcs. 
mental states, unlike Une.-proper mental states, are linked 
to verbal memories, or "word-presentations." Word- 
presentations are left by the memories of former perceptions 
or states of consciousness. The Pcs. connects the mental 
state to a word-presentation (or word-idea, 
"Wortvorstellung"), a process that can bring the mental 
state to consciousness. Consciousness perceives the mental 
state (which, as a previously unconscious mental state, 
existed only as a thing-presentation, or "Sachvorstellung," 
that is, as an idea that was not connected to a word or 
words) within a context of previous and associated percep­
tions. The word-presentation, as the memory of a previous 
perception or state, carries with it the quality that at­
tracts the perceiving organ, consciousness. Still, the 
linking of an unconscious mental state to a word- 
presentation only supplies the possibility of being per­
ceived by consciousness; the linking does not guarantee 
that the state will become conscious. Consciousness will 
perceive the preconscious state only if that state's word- 
presentation is relevant to or associated with
12
consciousness's current perceptions.^
Freud says that the two methods by which a state can 
become conscious are, if not wholly separate, different.® A 
state's seeking to discharge an unpleasurable excitation is a 
primitive or crude way of attracting the notice of conscious­
ness. Linking an unconscious state to a word-presentation is 
a more sophisticated, "delicate" way of readying a state for 
perception. Freud says that the former method is like that 
used for "external" perception, whereas the latter has to do 
only with "internal" perception. In its early stages, the 
organism receives two kinds of excitation, each of which 
gives rise to consciousness: external, or sensory, percep­
tion, and unpleasure. Only later does the organism develop 
the ability to bring to consciousness unconscious states that 
do not have a sufficient quantity of unpleasure to excite 
perception. These unconscious states are ideas, or thought- 
processes; the system Pcs. is able to connect the thing- 
presentations of these ideas with the word-presentations 
found in that system.
The difference between the two methods by which an 
unconscious state becomes conscious is found in the differ­
ence between the two kinds of mental states : states that at­
tach themselves to unpleasurable excitations, and ideas, 
states that do not. Freud.distinguishes between unconscious 
feelings, which have no commerce with the system Pcs. ("feel­
ings are either conscious or unconscious") and unconscious
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ideas, which must be given word-presentations in the Pcs. be­
fore they can become conscious.^ A feeling is perceptible 
simply because of a certain intensity of unpleasure; unplea­
surable excitations can force themselves upon consciousness 
without any intermediary work by the Pcs. The reason that 
unconscious feelings are perceived directly by consciousness 
is this: feelings are perceptible as feelings; or, in other
words, whatever a particular feeling is (called) does not mat­
ter so much as the simple discharge of cathexis. An uncon­
scious idea, on the other hand, cannot attract consciousness 
without being linked to the residues of former perceptions, 
or word-presentations. These word-presentations are what 
make the idea perceptible.
pWe find in Freud suggestions that an unconscious idea 
is the cathexis either of a memory (that is, something once, 
but no longer, perceived) or of an instinct or instinctual 
impulse. Unconscious ideas can exist "as actual structures in 
the system Ucs." An unconscious feeling, on the other hand, 
"corresponds to" a process of discharge, and cannot exist in 
the Ucs. the way a Sachvorstellung can. "Unconscious feeling" 
actually is a misnomer; the feeling itself is conscious but 
its idea is unconscious. That is, what we call an unconscious 
feeling is an affect whose idea has been repressed; the affect 
is not unperceived but is misconstrued by consciousness. Such 
a case occurs when a feeling, shaking itself free of its (un­
acceptable) idea, hooks itself up to an acceptable idea and.
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parasitelike, rides up to consciousness.
It seems that it is not the case that there are two 
types of unconscious states whose way of becoming conscious 
corresponds to their difference, but rather that there are 
two components of an unconscious mental state and these com­
ponents correspond to the two ways. These components are: 
the idea, which either is derived from perception and exists 
as a memory or is derived from some internal process and rep­
resents an unconscious instinct; and the affect or feeling, 
which is a process of discharge. Repression severs the con­
nection between an affect and its idea. Repression can suc­
ceed in preventing an idea from becoming preconscious or con­
scious, in which case the idea remains unconscious; if the 
repression fails or the idea is unthreatening, the 
Sachvorstellung becomes linked in the Pcs. with its 
Wortvorstellung and has a good chance of becoming conscious. 
The affect exists in the Ucs. only as a "beginning" whose end 
product— the discharge of cathexis— is perceived by the Cs. 
as a feeling. If the affect's idea is repressed, three possi­
ble courses offer themselves to the affect: The affect may
become conscious by attaching itself to another idea and in 
so doing causes itself to be misconstrued. Or thé affect may 
simply exchange its idea for that of anxiety and be perceived 
as anxiety. Or the affect may remain as it is in the Ucs. as 
an undeveloped potential for the discharge of cathexis.
Freud's discussion of how unconscious ideas become
15
conscious by means of becoming associated with words is more 
important to my dissertation than his discussion of the method 
of discharge of cathexis, because later I will argue that an 
unconscious state becomes conscious only when one can avow 
that state. I will claim that being aware of a state and 
being able verbally to admit that state are the same thing.
I believe that Freud is close to making the same claim when 
he says that a conscious state, that is, a state of which I 
am aware, is a thing-presentation linked with its word, 
whereas an unconscious state, of which I am not aware, is 
merely a thing-presentation.
Freud’s method of helping his patients to become 
aware of their unconscious states corraborates the claim that 
words, or speech, and consciousness are closely connected.
The psychoanalytic method is more or less the free-associative 
talk of the patient, in which the painful state (disguised in 
words that are associated with the state but are not the cor­
rect words for the state) pushes with an excess of cathexis 
up to consciousness: discovering the "true” unconscious state
simply is a matter of getting the patient to label the state 
with the correct (or better, perhaps, meaningful) words. The 
psychoanalytic method for revealing our unconscious states is 
a different kind of answer to the question. How do uncon­
scious states become conscious. The first kind of answer I 
gave to that question concerned the psychological theory 
Freud offers to explain the forces that function in the mind.
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The second kind of answer, of which psychoanalysis is an ex­
ample, concerns the way we become aware of our unconscious 
mental states. In the next section, I want to discuss another 
example of this second kind of answer; this example is Freud's 
explanation for why the concept of unconscious mental states 
is not only a necessary theoretical concept but also a means 
for our understanding others and ourselves.
Differences Continued; How We Become Aware 
of Unconscious Mental States 
The problem is this: On the one hand, unconscious
mental states are necessary for the assumption of a coherent 
mental life. On the other hand, these states are not avail­
able to us, for we are not aware of them. We know conscious 
mental states just because they are conscious. How do we know 
unconscious mental states?
While we are forced to assume an unconscious in order 
to make sense of mental life, in our everyday lives we are not 
inclined to assume such a concept. In fact, we repudiate it. 
But, says Freud, not only is the unconscious a necessary as­
sumption for theoretical reasons, but also it is a wholly 
legitimate assumption from the point of view of "our customary
Qand generally accepted mode of thinking." Freud begins his 
argument by claiming that we assume mental states in others, 
and that these mental states are assumed, not on the basis of 
introspection— which is how we know our own (conscious) mental 
states— but rather on the basis of an "identification" that we
17
extend to others. In order to make his point, Freud speaks 
in the language of the Cartesian. Freud says that conscious­
ness gives us only our own (conscious) mental states; we have 
"immediate certainty" only of our own conscious mental states. 
But we do assume that others have mental lives, even though we 
cannot know with "immediate certainty" that they do. Freud 
says that we infer by means of analogy that others are like 
us. The analogy is between the "observable behavior and ut­
terances" of others and our behavior, which (although Freud 
is not explicit here) we connect to our consciousness. The 
inference is that others' behavior is connected to minds the 
way ours is, and that their minds are like ours. This is the 
standard argument from analogy that is used to show that we 
can have knowledge of other minds, and this attributing of 
consciousness to others is the "customary and generally ac­
cepted mode of thinking" that Freud appeals to.
Freud wants us to apply this type of thinking to our­
selves; when we do so, we discover our own unconscious mental 
states. Here Freud's use of the Cartesian view of mind be­
comes interesting; for the Cartesian view— as well as the 
skeptical arguments that it tried to overturn— is based on the 
proposition that, whatever else may be doubted, the contents 
of consciousness cannot be doubted. Freud believes the oppo­
site of this. Freud grants that we have immediate certainty 
of consciousness,^® and he seems also in the best Cartesian 
tradition to believe that our knowledge of other minds is a
18
sort of inference. But whereas the Cartesian asks us to sup­
pose that others are like us, Freud asks us to suppose that 
are like others. The Cartesian relies for true knowledge on 
the introspectibility of one's own consciousness; and he pre­
sumes, by analogy, that others also have consciousness. Freud 
on the other hand places confidence in the inferential proces­
ses that he says we use on others and ought to use on ourselves. 
If I wish to attribute consciousness to others, I must infer it 
from their observable behavior— behavior that I can make sense 
of only if these others are conscious beings.
Freud is not really concerned with the skeptic's prem­
ise that we cannot know others' mental states, for he does not 
see knowledge of other minds as a problem. Yet Freud makes 
use of the argument from analogy which purports to answer the 
skeptic's skepticism, in order to justify the assumption of an 
unconscious. Freud says that we "infer" from others' behavior 
and utterances that they have consciousnesses; he says this to 
make a contrast with the non-inferential awareness that we 
have of our own consciousness. But then Freud in a parenthet­
ical aside retreats from the position he takes by use of the 
argument from analogy, and says that actually we don't infer 
anything at all. He says that "without any special reflec­
tion we attribute to everyone else our own constitution and 
therefore our consciousness as well, and . . . this identifi­
cation is a sine qua non of our understanding." Freud then 
retreats to his former position and concludes that "the
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assumption of a consciousness in [others] rests upon an in­
ference and cannot share the immediate certainty which we have 
of our own consciousness.”
What are we to make of all this? Freud surely cannot 
have thought that throughout this passage he was presenting 
the same position regarding our beliefs about others' minds.
To say that we infer from others' behavior that they have men­
tal lives and to say that we simply, without any special 
thought, assume that others have mental lives is not the same 
thing. But when we keep in mind Freud's purpose in this pas­
sage, the inconsistency is less bothersome. Freud wants to 
show that our attributing unconscious mental states to our­
selves is analogous to the process that we use to attribute 
consciousness to others, and that to do the former is legit­
imate because we do the latter. But to attribute unconscious 
mental states to ourselves requires a certain amount of infer­
ence and observation of behavior. Freud makes use of the argu­
ment from analogy to make the jump smoother from our customary 
mode of thought about others to the unaccustomed attribution 
of unconscious mental states to ourselves. The argument from 
analogy is based on the view that some process of inference 
is necessary before we can conceive of others as having mental 
lives— or, perhaps, before we can justify this supposition. 
This view perfectly parallels the problem with conceiving our­
selves to have mental lives unavailable for our introspection. 
So Freud played up this view.
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(Ironically, the plausibility of the argument from 
analogy derives from the case with which we can downplay the 
rather absurd complicatedness of the inferential process that 
the argument proposes. It is this ease that lets Freud— who 
has no skeptical doubts about other minds— slide into the 
parenthetical qualification in which he says that believing 
others to have human minds is a "sine qua non of our 
understanding.")
Freud seems to grant the skeptic's premise, that we 
don't know others' mental states (except by inference), that 
we know only our own (conscious) states. Then he reneges on 
his skepticism by claiming that we take it for granted that 
others have mental states. Freud relocates the skepticism 
that he so cavalierly disposed of so far as others goes; he 
agrees that it is hard to believe that we ourselves have men­
tal lives of which we know nothing— but that this disbelief 
can be just as easily disposed of as the other disbelief.
Freud uses the argument from analogy because it involves the 
sort of reasoning that not only laymen but also philosophers 
and psychologists and scientists are prone to use, Freud's 
parenthetical comment represents his own view on our knowl­
edge of other minds. For Freud the move from inference to 
unthinking assumption is merely an adjustment of a view that 
is not quite right into a view that is right. Freud has no 
real feel for the allure of skepticism, and hence no real feel 
for the differences in the two positions on other minds that 
he presents.
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Moreover, Freud wants only to show that in assuming 
an unconscious we are merely following our usual mode of 
thought. This mode of thought does not need to be philosoph­
ically respectable but only "customary and generally accepted." 
The concept of the unconscious may perhaps have seemed bi­
zarre; Freud shows that people do in fact slide from a primi­
tive acceptance of other minds to, sometimes, a rather more 
skeptical position. They do not as a rule wonder if everyone 
else is a robot or an illusion, but they do sometimes wonder 
if others have this feeling or that. Freud is taking advan­
tage of the ambiguity that we show in our approach to others’ 
minds in order to show that the assumption of an unconscious 
is not as far-fetched as it seems.
In this argument, Freud does not distinguish between 
the conscious and unconscious states of others. He speaks of 
our assuming or inferring others’ "consciousness," but he is 
using the term to refer to others’ minds and not simply to 
the conscious portion of their mental lives. Freud does this, 
first, because in 1915 "consciousness" was considered more or 
less synonymous with "mind," and Freud knew that his audience 
would be more inclined to hear him out if he did not yet argue 
the distinction between "consciousness" and "mind." Second, 
it makes no difference, so far as my apprehension of your men­
tal state goes, whether your mental state is conscious or un­
conscious: Neither is introspectible by me.
Now, however, Freud distinguishes between the conscious
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and the unconscious in ourselves. He says that psychoanaly­
sis asks only that we apply to ourselves the process of in­
ference that we use on others. If we do so, if we notice our 
own behavior that does not fit in with our introspectible 
states of consciousness, we must judge this behavior as if it 
were the behavior of another person. That is, we must connect 
this behavior to an inferred state of mind. This we ought 
easily to be able to do; as Freud has already shown, we read­
ily infer from others' behavior their intelligible, unintro- 
spectible (by us) states of mind. When we infer, rather than 
introspect, states of mind of our own, we are discovering our 
own unconscious mental states. Still, says Freud, although 
we can learn of our unconscious mental states in the way that 
we learn of others' mental lives, our unconscious is not 
exactly like the whole mental life of others.
Freud says that the analogy that we have drawn be­
tween others' minds and our own unconscious states drives us 
not to the Freudian unconscious but to the concept of a sec­
ond consciousness, of which we know nothing, that is linked 
to the consciousness that we introspect. We assume a second 
consciousness because we must infer it the way that we infer 
others' mental states— from behavior. When we infer mental 
states of our own on the basis of our behavior, we are led 
to assume a consciousness which is like someone else's linked 
up somehow with our own consciousness. But Freud argues that 
"a consciousness of which its possessor knows nothing is
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something very different from a consciousness belonging to 
another person, and it is questionable whether such a con­
sciousness, lacking as it does, its most important charac­
teristic, deserves any discussion at all." The "most impor­
tant characteristic" consciousness. But even though we 
have to infer both the mental states of others (conscious as 
well as unconscious states) and our own unconscious mental 
states, the parallel cannot be extended too far. The analogy 
applies only to the method by which we come to know these 
states. One reason that the analogy is limited is that the 
mental states that we infer in others represent a complete 
psychical order, whereas those that we infer in ourselves are 
only unconscious. Second, many unconscious processes are in­
dependent of one another. Freud says that this, coupled with 
our giving to our unconscious the nature of a second con­
sciousness, must lead us to infer an unlimited number of con­
sciousnesses, all of which are unknown to us and to each 
other; and this is far less plausible than merely assuming an 
unconscious mental life in each of us. Third, psychoanalytic 
treatment shows that some of these unconscious processes are 
characterized by "peculiarities" that are alien to the famil­
iar characteristics of our consciousness, and thus that argue 
against being processes of a second consciousness. Given 
these considerations, says Freud, we should modify our first 
assumption— that we have a second consciousness in ourselves—  
to another, less drastic assumption, namely, that we have
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legitimate grounds for believing in the existence of a men­
tal order in ourselves that lacks consciousness.
There are a couple of problems with this analogical 
argument. Let me lay out the argument briefly. Freud says:
(1) We have immediate certainty of our own con­
sciousness.
(2) We infer consciousness (mind) in others; we do 
this on the basis of others' "observable behavior and utter­
ances. "
(3) We infer, by an analogy between others' behavior 
and our own, mental states of our own that are not intro­
spected; these are our own unconscious mental states.
(4) We have to modify this last inference, because 
it leads logically to the assumption of a mental life com­
posed of both conscious and unconscious mental states.
Steps One and Two are an abbreviated statement of the 
argument from analogy that is used traditionally to show that 
we have knowledge of other minds. There is a link missing in 
Freud's statement, namely, that we connect to our conscious­
ness our physical and behavioral dimensions; but this premise 
is implicitly assumed. The place that the argument becomes 
novel and interesting is Step Three. Here Freud takes the 
traditional argument from analogy and reverses it. In the 
traditional argument, we reason from the connection we see 
between our own mental states and behavior to the connection 
we must suppose to exist between others' behavior and mental
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life. We reason thus because we observe that others behave 
similarly to us; others must have a mental life because they 
behave like us, and our behavior is connected to a mental 
life. Freud asks us to reason the other way around; he asks 
us to proceed from the mental lives of others, which we as­
sume or infer from their behavior, to our own unintrospected 
mental states, which we must suppose are connected to our be­
havior in the way that others' states are connected to their 
behavior.
The argument from analogy no longer enjoys philosoph­
ical favor; but Freud's use of it to overcome our skepticism 
concerning an unconscious does not, I believe, encounter the 
same problems that undermine the traditional use to which the 
argument was put. The most basic objection to the traditional 
argument from analogy is that no sophisticated process of in­
ferential reasoning takes place before we can know that others 
have minds. Our belief that others have minds and mental 
states is a primitive, pre-reflective response to others. If 
we questioned whether others are beings with minds, then an 
account like the one offered by the analogical argument might 
make sense. But we do not raise the question. Connected to 
this objection to the argument from analogy is another prob­
lem: Contrary to the argument, we do not reason from our own 
case to the case of everyone else. A two-year-old girl heard 
the yelping of a dog who was being examined by the vet. The 
little girl looked mournful: "Poor doggy, poor doggy." It
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is not plausible to suppose that the child was making an in­
ference from her own case to that of the dog.
The reverse argument from analogy is not susceptible 
to either of these objections. While the regular argument 
from analogy is misguided because it sees our acceptance of 
others as a sophisticated rather than a primitive response, 
the reverse argument is a pretty good account of how we do 
often come to know our own unconscious mental states. For 
the realizing of one's own unconscious state is not a pre- 
ref lective, natural process; it takes a psychologically so­
phisticated person to notice and recognize in his behavior 
signs of unconscious activity. And the recognition of uncon­
scious mental states in others, a recognition made on the 
basis of observing others' behavior, is the prerequisite for 
the analogous recognition of similar states in oneself. The 
second point, that we do not reason from our own case to that 
of others is consistent with, not contradicted by, the re­
verse argument. The reverse argument is that we reason from 
the case of others to our own case.
But is the reverse argument open to objections from
other quarters? We have discussed the objection, which Freud 
himself poses, that what we are led to assume by the reverse 
argument is not an unconscious in ourselves but rather a sec­
ond consciousness; Freud gives us three good reasons for 
drawing the first conclusion rather than the second. The
only other real problem is that our becoming aware of our
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unconscious mental states is very often a more subtle gra­
dated process than the reverse argument suggests. But while 
the usual case is that our discrepant behavior caused by un­
conscious states is not blatant enough for us to notice it 
as discrepant, nevertheless most of us at some time are vic­
timized by our own odd and inexplicable behavior. In such 
cases, we do reason from our behavior to what "must be" our 
mental state. But even if such cases are unusual, they do 
provide an example of a process that is the starting point 
for the discovery of one's own unconscious states. And 
Freud uses the reverse argument for exactly that purpose.
Freud shows with the gap argument that the concept of 
unconscious mental states is necessary if we are to have an 
understanding of mind. He shows with the reverse argument 
from other minds that we habitually conceive of others in 
such a way as to make the assumption of unconscious states in 
others and ourselves easy. I believe that Freud saw both of 
these arguments merely as tools with which to get in the 
hostile psychologist's door; but in spite of his protests 
that they are crude arguments that later he will refine, they 
are interesting, persuasive, and ingenious.
Freud's characterization of conscious states as those 
of which I am aware and unconscious states as those of which 
I am not aware, his insistence that awareness or the lack of 
it is the main distinction between conscious and unconscious 
states, is the basis for a theory of mind that holds that our
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mental life is a coherent whole. The characterization that 
Prend gives of unconscious mental states, which makes them 
sound very different from conscious states, can be accounted 
for by the lack of awareness that we have of them.^^ Being 
aware of a state makes us feel the need to incorporate it in­
to the fairly well-integrated body of our other beliefs, it 
forces us to change our beliefs as we become more mature or 
different through experience, it causes us to weigh consid­
erations of pleasure against the demands of other aspects of 
reality. When we are unaware of a state, we cannot subject 
it to the scrutiny of reason and reasonableness; in fact, we 
deny even having such a state. In the following chapters, I 
will pursue my own more properly philosophical course in dis­
tinguishing between conscious and unconscious mental states; 
but that course, for me, begins here, with Freud.
NOTES
^See, for example, Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation 
of Dreams, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psycholog­
ical Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and translated by James 
Strachey, V (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of
Psycho-Analysis, 1953), pp. 610-618, and Sigmund Freud, "The 
Unconscious," XV, pp. 166-171; this sequence (of gap argument 
then distinction between Pcs. and Ucs.) is not followed in 
Freud's The Ego and The Id, XIX. (In this dissertation all 
references to Freud's work are to the Standard Edition.)
2Freud, "Unconscious," pp. 186-187. When Freud says 
that Ucs. ideas are exempt from mutual contradiction, he is 
not referring to the mere incompatibility of, say, desires 
that are inconsistent with one another and that give rise to 
ambivalent feelings in a person; he is saying that Ucs. ideas 
contain no degrees of uncertainty whatsoever, so that a pair 
of incompatible desires in the Ucs. would not be touched by 
ambivalence at all but rather would stand intractably opposed 
to each other. (Freud does not use "contradiction" in the 
logician's sense that the presence of A precludes the presence 
of B.)
"Cathexis" is another rather idiosyncratic concept. 
Cathexis is the quantity (of which we have no means of mea­
suring) of "energy" or "excitation" in an idea. In the Ucs., 
ideas are subject to the "primary process," which means that 
ideas press "uninhibitedly" toward "discharge" through con­
sciousness, hence, the "mobility" of cathexis. In the Cs., 
ideas are subject to the "secondary process," which is the 
repression or inhibition of cathexis. I will discuss this 
topic in more detail in the second section of this chapter.
^Freud, "Unconscious," p. 171; see also Interpreta­
tion, pp. 573-575, and Ego/Id, pp. 20-23.
4Freud, "Project For a Scientific Psychology," I, 
p. 312; Interpretation, pp. 573-574; Ego/Id, p. 22.
^Freud, Interpretation, pp. 600, 617-618; "Uncon­
scious," p. 201ff.; Ego/ld, 20-23.
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^Freud, Interpretation, pp. 573-575.
^Freud, Ego/Id, pp. 20-23.
®Freud, "Unconscious," pp. 177-179, 201.
Q Freud, "Unconscious," p. 169. All other quotes in 
this section will be from this paper, pp. 169-171.
^^But even on this point Freud withholds final acqui­
escence, for he believes that much of our introspectible men­
tal life is disguised, hence often we introspect only the 
disguise.
^^This is not to claim that the characteristics he 
gives to unconscious states actually exist, but only to say 
that such characteristics are not inconsistent with our lack 
of awareness of such states.
CHAPTER II
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS
"Conscious” and "Aware"
I want to show that conscious mental states are 
states 6f which one is aware. I want to show that if I am 
not aware of my mental state m, then, m is not conscious, and 
that if I am aware of my mental state m, then m ^  conscious:
I want to show that one's awareness of mental state m is both 
a necessary and a sufficient condition of m's being 
conscious.
It may seem superfluous to point out the close con­
nection between "conscious" and "aware," since often we use 
the terms interchangeably. We say, "She was aware of a light 
footstep in the hall," and, just as easily, "She was conscious 
of a light footstep in the hall." (We find the easy inter­
changeableness of the terms in the verbal forms that take 
"of" or "that," not so much in the other forms of the terms.) 
But if we do often use the terms interchangeably, then my 
characterization of conscious mental states as those states 
of which one is aware seems to be pleonastic or trivial. But
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I will argue that treating the two terms as if they are syn­
onymous obscures the relationship between them and leads to 
certain misconceptions about the nature of consciousness (and 
of the unconscious). And while we do in fact often interchange 
"aware" and "conscious," nevertheless, we also often show a 
preference for one term over the other. We snap, "I'm aware 
of that!" to show that nothing important has slipped by us, 
that we are alert to all the ramifications of the situation, 
that we are at least two steps ahead of you; we do not say,
"I'm conscious of that!" We say with relief, "He is conscious 
now," but not, "He is aware now." The former statement ex­
presses the distinction between being conscious and uncon­
scious, or perhaps, being revived and knocked out. The lat­
ter statement obviously has its roots in the former but is 
not interchangeable with the former. If you say, "He is 
aware now," you may be a member of a religious sect speaking 
of a recent convert; your use of "aware" functions as a meta­
phor, as in "I was blind, but now I see." Or you are the 
father of a sixteen-year-old who thought that drivers have 
the right-of-way through pedestrian crosswalks, and who ran 
over a pedestrian who failed to yield to him; you post bond, 
lecture the kid all the way home; as you tell your wife the 
story, she exclaims, "How could he not be aware that pedes­
trians have the right-of-way?" You say grimly, "Well, he's 
aware now." In this case, the question of being conscious or 
not concerns the unfortunate pedestrian.
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Adopting a few explicit distinctions between "con­
scious" and "aware" will undercut the charge of pleonasm; the 
distinctions are justified by the ordinary cases in which we 
prefer one term to another, just as our habit of treating the 
two as if they were synonymous is justified by the instances 
in which we show little or no preference.^ The distinctions 
I propose will guarantee that the claim "Conscious mental 
states are those of which one is aware" is a significant claim, 
and will felicitously provide a means for the exorcising 
certain demons lurking in traditional theories of mind. Let 
us turn now to the distinctions.
In Content and Consciousness, D.C. Dennett proposes
2to limit "conscious" to non-intentional uses; that is, he 
prohibits our use of "of x" and "that x" after "he was con­
scious." Dennett says that we can use "conscious" only in 
contexts like these; "he is conscious," "he is unconscious," 
"he is a conscious being." Dennett would form all intentional 
idioms with "aware," not "conscious," for example: "he was
aware of x," and "he was aware that x." Dennett says that 
ordinarily we use both terms both intentionally and non- 
intentional ly; but he points out that, if in the interests of 
order, we limit each term to one use only, "conscious" sounds 
more natural than "aware" in non-intentional idioms. And 
"aware" sounds at least no less natural than "conscious" in 
intentional idioms.^ I propose to follow Dennett in this 
distinction.
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However, limiting "aware” to intentional uses still 
leaves some ambiguity in our use of the term. As Dennett 
points out, often we confuse two very different, intentional 
notions of "aware." When we confuse these notions, we are 
led into such errors as our supposing, when we say that the 
swerving bee is aware of the tree, that we are saying the 
same thing about the bee as we are saying about the person 
when we say that ^  is aware of the tree. We reinforce the 
error, rather than remedy it, when we realize that, since the 
bee cannot tell us what he is aware of, we cannot know what 
he is aware of. Here we become— absurdly— involved in the 
problem of knowledge of bees* minds. And also we start asking 
questions like: Is the bee aware of the tree as a tree, or as
an obstacle in the course of his flight, or what? The confu­
sion between our notions of "aware" arises, says Dennett, be­
cause we have not separated the two features of our talk about 
awareness: introspection and behavior control.
Sometimes when we are asked what we are aware of, we 
respond by giving an introspective report; we report, say, 
our feelings or perceptions. A dumb animal can never respond 
in this way. And yet we often speak of animals being aware 
of things: we say that the bee that swerved just before hit­
ting the tree "must have been aware of" the tree. Similarly, 
we say of the driver of the car that he "must have been aware 
of" the route after he steered the car around the curves of 
the (familiar) road and got off on the right exit. We say
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this even though the driver paid no particular attention to 
his driving or to the road, and in fact was thinking of other 
things throughout the drive and upon reflection cannot recall 
making the correct turns. Dennett wants to call the type of 
awareness that involves the introspective reporting of the 
contents of our consciousness "awareness^." He restricts 
this type of awareness to speaking creatures. "AwarenesSg" 
has to do with the directing and control of behavior, and all 
sentient creatures can be awareg of something. Awareness2 
can involve later speculation: "I must have been aware of
what I was doing, because although I didn't think about it,
I got off the highway at the correct exit." Such speculation 
is not privileged in the way that introspective reporting 
connected to awareness^ is held to be privileged. Another 
person can be in an equally good— or even better— position
4to comment on a person's directing of his behavior.
Let us turn now from a discussion of "aware" to one 
of "conscious." Dennett does not break down his analysis of 
the use of "conscious" further than his initial restriction 
of the term to non-intentional uses. But even if we restrict 
"conscious" to intentional uses, we are left with several 
uses of the term. For A to have a conscious mental state, 
and for A to be a conscious being, and for A to be, simply, 
conscious, are all different things. We easily can see this 
by looking at the contrasts to examples of each case. When 
we say "A's mental state is conscious," we are contrasting
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his state to an unconscious mental state; the contrast is be­
tween, say, a conscious desire and an unconscious one. When 
we say, "A is a conscious being," we are contrasting him with 
the sort of entity to which we do not attribute consciousness, 
for example, a rock. When we say, "A is conscious now," we 
mean that he has come out of a coma; we mean that he is not 
"unconscious," or not in "a state of unconsciousness."
The distinction among our uses of "conscious" is con­
nected to the distinction between our uses of "aware" in at 
least these three ways: First, that A is conscious and some­
how engaged with x entails only that A is awareg of x. (That 
A is conscious does not entail that A is aware^ of x.) Aware- 
nessg typically is a necessary and sufficient condition of 
A's being conscious. [There seems to be a striking exception: 
sleepwalking. Think of the sleepwalker who gets out of bed, 
gets his socks from the dresser drawer, puts them on his feet, 
descends the stairs, goes out the front door, and locks him­
self out. He is awareg of the dresser, the socks, the stairs, 
the front door, because his behavior takes account of these in 
the appropriate way (as the bee's behavior takes account of 
the tree in the appropriate way); but certainly he cannot at 
any point in the sleepwalk give an introspective report on 
what he is doing or thinking. If we were to awaken him, he 
would not know where he is or what he is doing; he is asleep. 
Here, awarenessg is not a sufficient condition for A's being 
conscious. But, I am not sure that we would want to regard
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being asleep as being unconscious, at least not in the way 
that we regard being knocked out or in a coma as being uncon­
scious; so I am not sure that sleepwalking an exception to 
the claim that awarenessg is a necessary and sufficient con­
dition of A's being conscious.] Awareness^, on the other 
hand, is only a sufficient condition for A's being conscious. 
For example, we know that A is conscious— and not in a coma—  
when he drives home from work. If you are in the car with A, 
and you ask him what he is thinking, and he says, "I am con­
centrating on my driving, because the road is so slick," we 
would say that A is aware^ of his driving. If his answer is, 
"I am watching for my exit," we would say that he is aware^ 
of looking for the correct exit ramp. In both these cases, 
our saying that A is aware^ entails that he is conscious.
But that A is conscious does not imply that he is aware^ of 
any aspect of his driving home. Suppose you ask him what he 
is thinking, just before he changes lanes to go onto the exit 
ramp, and he replies, "I am thinking how hungry I am." Here, 
we cannot say that A is aware^ of looking for the exit ramp; 
we can say only that he is aware^ of it, and that that en­
tails that he is conscious. And that A is conscious and 
doing something entails that he is at least awareg of some­
thing. That is, his driving home successfully entails that 
he is awarSg of, perhaps, the car ahead of him, or the slick­
ness of the wet highway.
The second way in which "aware" and "conscious" are
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connected is this; That A is a conscious being means that A 
is a creature capable of awareness^; but just what creatures 
are capable of awareness^ is open in some cases to dispute. 
Rocks are not capable of awareness^; people are. Are very 
small children? Are animals? While we want to say that an­
imals are conscious, when they are not drugged or in a coma 
or so forth, nevertheless, we are not inclined to say that a 
giraffe is a conscious being. With the exception of certain 
pet lovers who anthropomorphize Fido's every action, we re­
strict the status of "conscious being" to human beings. We 
do this because "only people think." But here, I think, our 
reasoning ought to be: "Only people speak." For when we
make thinking, i.e., the conscious thought process, the mark 
of the conscious being, we divide the world into thinking and 
non-thinking creatures. And again, when the examples are a 
rock and a normal adult human being, we have no difficulty 
with the categories. But what do we say of the cat who, tiny 
paws cupped, shovels the contents of his litter box onto the 
clean kitchen floor after you have locked him in the kitchen 
overnight? We might want to say, "He decided to get back at 
me," and this is perfectly all right in that we habitually 
ascribe intentions to animals; it makes sense to ascribe in­
tentions to animals. It is more reasonable to suppose that 
Morris meant to get back at me for locking him up than to 
suppose that his scattering the litter was entirely coinci­
dental, especially if whenever I lock him up he scatters the
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litter or tears the curtains. But saying that Morris meant 
to get even does not involve the claim that Morris, dis­
traught and conniving, thought to himself, "Let's see, now, 
if I were to shred these curtains, she'd sure be sorry. . ."
We do not want to consider the cat a thinking, conscious 
being in the way that we consider a human being a thinking, 
conscious being. But why not?
We cannot suppose the cat's action to be the fulfill­
ment of a consciously perpetrated plan. Our reason for saying 
this so confidently is that it makes no sense to say other­
wise. There is no "test" by which we could tell that the 
revenge was conscious, i.e., reasoned out, thought through.
How do we tell with human beings then? Human beings tell us 
that they meant to do such-and-such, or deny that they meant 
to. But cats cannot speak; they cannot avow or deny their 
intentions. "No, no," you say. "The point is that Morris 
had only to think to himself that he intended such-and-such." 
But animals who cannot speak cannot think, at least not in 
the way that human beings think (when they consciously think), 
and the way human beings think is the standard, and ulti­
mately involves speech. The confusion concerning "inten­
tional" comes from our thinking that, if an action obviously 
is intended, it must have been thought through consciously.
But intention has to do with the appropriateness of the ac­
tion— say, doing something naughty (ruining the clean floor)—  
to the proposed aim— say, getting back at someone (upsetting
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me); intention does not necessarily involve the perpetrator's 
being engaged in a verbal thought process which spells out 
the plan of action. If the cat cannot (ever) tell us that 
he thought or meant such-and-such, then we must say that he 
is not capable of thinking (the way humans think)— because 
he cannot, any more than a human can, have a private intro­
spective language. Humans introspect, because they have (a 
public) language, because they are linguistic.^ The crite­
rion for a creature's being a conscious being ought to be 
his ability to use language rather than his ability to think.
We don't quite know what to say of talking dolphins 
or language-using apes. When the criterion for being a con­
scious being is the ability to think, to "reason," then de­
ciding whether or not A is a conscious being is to some ex­
tent a matter of convention— because we cannot decide whether 
the cat "must have been" thinking or not. I will argue that 
the decision need not be so arbitrary and should be based on 
the criterion of speech. I think that most of us would agree 
that robots are not conscious beings, but perhaps someday, 
faced with a linguistically fluent C3P0, we would want to say 
that an android^ can satisfy the criterion for awareness^, 
that is, for introspective reporting, and hence is a con­
scious being.
The third connection between "conscious" and "aware" 
is this: For A to have a conscious mental state m(x), A must 
be aware^ of x. That is, awareness^ of x is a necessary
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condition of A*s having conscious mental state m. It does 
not follow from this that A is not conscious if he is en­
gaged in behavior that indicates that he has mental state m 
and yet is not aware^ of x. What follows is that A is awareg 
of X and is conscious.
Only language-users can have conscious mental states 
because only language-users can be or not be aware^ of x.
This is not to say that non-language-users have (only) uncon­
scious mental states. The distinction between conscious and 
unconscious mental states applies only to language-users be­
cause the criterion by which we judge a state conscious is 
the subject's ability to speak, to give an introspective re­
port. An analogy will support this: It makes no more sense
to say that the mental states of cats are all unconscious 
mental states than to say that a rock is unconscious all the 
time: being unconscious applies only to sentient creatures,
that is, to creatures who are capable of being both conscious 
(not drugged or knocked out) and unconscious. A rock is 
neither conscious nor unconscious; a cat can be either con­
scious or unconscious, but he can have neither conscious nor 
unconscious mental states (although he does have mental states, 
such as wanting, believing, and so forth); a human being can 
be conscious or unconscious, and he can have conscious and 
unconscious mental states.
To sum up: To be conscious, you have to be awarsg,
and vice versa; awarenessg is based on sentience; both language-
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users and non-language-users can be awareg of x. To be a 
conscious being, you have to be capable of awareness^, which 
is dependent on the ability to speak. To have a conscious 
mental state m(x) , you must be a w a r e o f  x. Only language- 
users can be aware^ of x.
In the next section, I will focus on the concept of 
awareness^, in particular on its relation to introspection. 
In this chapter, we have seen that awareness^ is closely re­
lated to the concept of conscious mental states and to 
speech. In Section Two, we will see that our discussion of 
the concept of awareness^, and speech, and conscious mental 
states, will lead us to redefine the concept of introspec­
tion, which, in turn, will illuminate the conclusions of 
this section.
Introspection
I want to argue for the traditional claim that all 
conscious mental states are introspectible, but I want to 
reassess what it means for a mental state to be introspec­
tible. I claim that the traditional concept of introspec­
tion is embedded in a view of mind that is wrong, but that 
reworked in a post-Freudian framework, the concept provides 
the criteria by which we can distinguish conscious from un­
conscious mental states. We will find that such a reworking 
results in a view that consciousness is a quite specialized 
mental phenomenon, and not— as the traditional view has it—  
the "typical" condition of mind.
43
The traditional theory of mind describes introspec­
tion as the attending of consciousness to its own workings 
or to its own states. This concept of introspection is 
based upon three interlocking traditions; the use of think­
ing as the paradigm conscious mental state, the identifica­
tion of mind with consciousness, and the contrasting of in­
trospection with perception, a contrast that ultimately sug­
gests that the two are the same sort of process but are fo­
cussed upon two different types of objects. The first two 
traditions are examples of generalizing from a quite re­
stricted species of datum— in this case, the conscious thought 
process— to a wide-ranging genus of data— here, all mental 
states. These two views burden the concept of introspection 
with functions that it cannot perform because the concept 
makes sense only when applied to one type of mental state, 
the paradigmatic conscious mental state. If the concept of 
introspection is asked to perform only in terms of that one 
type mental state, then it very nearly distinguishes con­
scious from unconscious mental states.
The primary question concerning introspection has al­
ways been, does introspection accompany every mental state? 
Philosophers thought that it must, for the nature of mind—  
i.e., of consciousness— is its peculiar transparence or re- 
flexivity. In fact, this reflexivity was considered so funda­
mental to consciousness that no term— other than "conscious­
ness" itself— was assigned to refer to this peculiarity until
44
the late nineteenth century. Then, the term "introspection” 
was introduced, and contrasted to the term "perception,” 
which refers to consciousness's attending to external 
objects.^
If introspection is not just closely associated with 
consciousness, but is actually part of what consciousness is, 
then by definition introspection accompanies every (conscious) 
mental state. Obviously, then, introspection has to be innoc­
uous enough not to obtrude upon the mental state that it ac­
companies, and yet salient enough to warrant our philosophi­
cally noticing it at all. For if, oh the one hand, we con­
ceive introspection in too innocuous a way, we have the ab­
surdity that part of the nature of consciousness, which in­
tuitively is accessible or transparent, is inaccessible— that 
is, unconscious. And if, on the other hand, we think of in­
trospection in too pronounced a way, as a sort of examining, 
then we have the difficulty of explaining why in fact we can­
not find it operating much of the time. This second diffi­
culty we have still to face even after we no longer identify 
consciousness with the whole of the mental, because of the 
traditional analogy between introspection and perception.
If introspection is a mark of the mental, then unin- 
trospectible (mental) states are not, by definition, mental 
states— or better, there are no unintrospectible mental 
states. This is the pre-Freudian view. The post-Freudian 
view holds that unintrospectible mental states do exist.
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therefore consciousness cannot be coextensive with the men­
tal. On both of these views, only and all those states that 
can be introspected are conscious states. But on the pre- 
Freudian view, the paradigm of the thought process obscures 
other kinds of mental states traditionally held to be con­
scious, however clumsily they fit that mold. An example of 
such states is perception; many of our perceptions are uncon-
gscious. Take the case of the man who successfully drives 
from his office to his home without noticing any of the land­
marks that map his route, although he must have perceived 
them in order to have taken the correct exit off the highway.
On the post-Freudian view, we have allowed ourselves 
the luxury of unintrospectible unconscious mental states.
But we still perhaps are bound by the convention that all 
conscious states are introspectible in the way that conscious 
thought processes are. Here is one place that the juxtaposi­
tion of introspection and perception confuses us. Perception 
is the attending to an external object; the paradigmatic ex­
ample of perception is seeing— especially, seeing a tree. 
Introspection is the attending to an internal object, the 
conscious state itself. Another way of putting this is that 
perception has to do with outer stimuli and introspection 
with inner stimuli. The relationship would then seem to be 
this: We perceive the tree and we introspect the perception
of the tree. We think of introspection as an inner analogue 
to perception, so we might rephrase the relationship like
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this: We perceive the tree and we perceive that perception.
Just as when we (consciously) perceive an object we take 
note of it, so also when we introspect a mental state, we 
take note of that state. Or so goes the reasoning. But even 
if introspection is "consciousness attending to itself," it 
does not follow that "attending" here means "watching." We 
are misled even by the word itself: "introspection" makes
us think of "inspection," which suggests a careful visual 
examination. It just seems that watching is what introspec­
tion must be when our typical conscious mental state is held 
to be a thought process and when our analogical model for in­
trospection is perception, typically seeing.
But viewing introspection as a sort of perceptual 
process that accompanies our every mental state seems to en­
tail not only that we are— every time that we perform— our 
own audience, but also that we suppose that every mental 
state that we have is followed by an infinite series of men­
tal states. The first state in that series would be either 
a perception or an introspection; if the first, it would have 
to be introspected, and that introspection, which is a mental 
state, would have to be introspected, ad infinitum. If the 
first state were an introspection, the same result would fol­
low. But there is no necessity for interpreting "attending" 
as "watching." "Attending to" our (conscious) mental states 
could be conceived as being set for a certain kind of action, 
that is, being in a position with relation to the state such
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that a certain kind of behavior could be expected. On this 
interpretation, a conscious state of love would involve, per­
haps, saying, "I love you,” to the loved one; on the tradi­
tional interpretation, a (conscious) state of love necessarily 
would involve a scrutiny turned inward, a self-conscious exam­
ination of the nuances of the feeling. And while such a 
scrutiny is not rare when one is in love, nevertheless it 
clearly is wrong that one's being in love consciously neces­
sitates one's being in love self-consciously.
There is no reason that "introspection” has to be a 
watching process. The only demand is that we do justice to 
the phenomenon that introspection is supposed to account 
for— our awareness of our conscious mental states. And this 
awareness can be explained by an appeal to the kinds of things 
we may be expected to do when, say, we are aware of our being 
in love. Part of our wanting to conceive of introspection as 
a monitoring or watching process is that our model for intro­
spection is perception, and both the paradigm and the typi­
cal perceptions are seeing something. We extend the example 
of sight metaphorically to all cases of knowing something:
We "view" his theory askance when we are skeptical of its 
worth; we "see the light” when finally we understand a prop­
osition; we say that you have "second sight” when you are 
especially perspicacious. And we think of introspection, 
which is the means for knowing our conscious mental states, 
as a sort of seeing the contents of consciousness. It is
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harmless to say "I see" when you finally understand how to 
work out a problem in symbolic logic, because you do not lit­
erally mean that your understanding is visual; you are speak­
ing metaphorically. But when you think of introspection as 
an observing of your thoughts, as an inspection of your con­
sciousness, that necessarily occurs every time you are con­
sciously engaged, then the metaphor is harmful; it is mis­
leading. For we are not continually gauging our conscious 
mental states, we usually are not watching ourselves, are not 
taking explicit note of our feelings, are not "self-conscious." 
When we explain the distinctive element in conscious mental 
states, which is our introspective awareness of them, in terms 
of watching, we demand that it be the case that human beings 
are constantly vigilant over their mental lives. But that 
just is not the case. I propose to sever introspection's 
analogical tie to visual perception and to interpret intro­
spection in terms of the behavioral follow-up that we expect 
as a consequence of one's being in conscious mental state 
m(x) .
There is another contrast between perception and in­
trospection supporting the claim that introspective awareness 
involves, not observation, but a certain expectable behavior.
In giving examples of perception, we do not separate the per­
ception of an object from the specific type of perception in­
volved. We say, "He heard the sound of raucous laughter"; 
and we say, "He perceived the sound of raucous laughter." We
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may be aware of a more formal tone in the latter statement, 
but essentially we hear no difference between the two state­
ments. "Perception" is the generic term for every kind of 
perceiving. If I were to say that I perceive a tree ahead, 
you understand immediately that I see a tree ahead; if, run­
ning my hands over the table I wanted to buy, I say that I 
perceive a slight crack in the wood, you understand that I 
feel a crack. If I perceive something, I see it, or hear it, 
or touch or smell it; we do not think of perception as occur­
ring apart from a specific instance of sight, hearing, or 
otherwise sensing.
But we demand that introspection be an essential part 
of all conscious mental states and yet also be separable from 
them. In other words, we wish introspection to function both 
generically and specifically, as a type of state in itself.
We want "introspection" to be a generic term that functions 
like the generic term "perception," but invariably we distin­
guish, say, introspecting an emotion from feeling it. If I 
say that I feel great sorrow, your expectation is that I will 
cry or otherwise perform in a way that shows my sorrow. How­
ever, if I say that I am introspecting great sorrow, you per­
haps think of me noting the nuances of my sorrow, but you do
9not expect me to cry. Arthur Falk claims that the reason for 
our wanting to distinguish the introspection of sorrow from 
the feeling of sorrow is that we associate with the feeling 
certain behavioral consequences that we do not associate with
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the introspection. If I itch, you expect me to scratch; if 
I introspect my itch, you do not. Falk finds no reason to 
suspect that we employ "two different modes of access" to 
each mental state (although he believes that, with certain 
mental states, divided attention may occur: for example, we
can drive a car and listen to conversation simultaneously). 
The temptation to assume a separate, unique form of intro­
spective attention arises from the difference we perceive 
between your saying that you feel an itch and your saying 
that you introspect an itch. This difference arouses in us 
different expectations concerning your probable behavioral 
follow-ups: I expect you to do one thing if you feel an
itch, namely, scratch, and another if you introspect an itch, 
namely, mentally examine the itch. But these differing ex­
pectations need not in themselves lead us to postulate two 
separate modes of access to the state.
Still, in spite of Falk's disclaimer about different 
modes of access, we want to ask: Why insist that "introspec­
tion" be a generic term like "perception"? And: How can we
claim that introspection functions analogously to percep­
tion?— for we have seen that some perceptions are intro­
spected, so that it would seem that the set of introspec­
tions includes some perceptions and not that the set of in­
trospections and the set of perceptions are equal and sepa­
rate sets. The answer to the second question is that per­
ceptions are mental states and introspection characterizes
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all conscious mental states; therefore all perceptions that 
are conscious are introspected, in just the same way that all 
conscious "inner" states are introspected. The analogy be­
tween "introspection" and "perception" concerns the question 
whether or not introspection is a unique mental state. We 
have found that we are inclined to use the two terms analo­
gously— but if we do, we must view introspection as a generic 
concept, like perception. And if we see introspection as 
generic, then the genus to which "introspection" refers must 
be the group of mental states that are conscious. But many 
perceptions are conscious, and conscious perceptions are in­
trospected. Therefore we have the absurdity that introspec­
tion and perception both function analogously and do not func­
tion analogously. If, on the other hand, we decline from the 
start to use the terms analogously, if we decide that intro­
spection is a unique type of state, then we must view intro­
spection in the traditional way, as a reflective process 
that accompanies some mental states. But "reflection" is a 
perfectly good name for such a process, and there is no need 
to coin "introspection" to refer to the reflective review of 
certain states that we do occasionally take. So, while we 
do not want to think of introspection as a unique mental 
state and do want to think of it as a generic concept, we do 
not want to say that introspection functions analogously to 
that other generic concept, perception.
In the next section, i will argue that the basis for
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distinguishing between feeling an emotion and introspecting 
it is that the characteristic behavioral follow-ups to be 
expected in the two cases differ. I will argue that the dif­
ference in the behavioral follow-ups functions as a criterion 
for distinguishing conscious from unconscious mental states. 
We know, when you scratch your arm, that you itch; but we do 
not know if that itch is conscious: it may be that you have
no idea that you are scratching— and therefore itching— until 
I say to you: "Stop that; you're going to make yourself
bleed." But suppose you have poison ivy and have been warned 
not to touch it; you do not scratch, but you say: "I'm going
out of my mind from the itching!" I will claim that your in­
trospective report is the characteristic behavioral follow-up 
of your introspecting your itch. I will claim further that 
the introspective report is our guarantee that your state is 
conscious, and that your inability to give an introspective 
report or avowal— in spite of all sorts of leading or infor­
mative behavior— indicates that the mental state is 
unconscious.
Thought and Speech 
Much of our thinking about the concept of introspect 
tion parallels our thinking about the concept of thought.
This is so for at least two reasons. First, the concept of 
introspection is modelled on that of the traditional concept 
of conscious thought; I have discussed this above. Second, 
introspection is to introspective reporting as thought is to
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speaking. That is, just as the introspective report sup­
posedly is an expressing, publicly, of the introspection it­
self, so also the speaking supposedly is an expressing of 
the inner thought. In the previous section, when I discussed 
the first reason for the linking of the concepts of intro­
spection and thought, I claimed that thought is only one ex­
ample of a mental state and further that it is not the typ­
ical mental state. I suggested that, on the other hand, 
"introspection" is a generic term for an aspect that is char­
acteristic of all conscious mental states. These two claims 
result in the proposition that thought is less than we had 
supposed, and introspection more. The conclusion was that 
the analogy between thought and introspection was not apt.
In this section, I want to examine the second reason 
that we are inclined to think that introspection and thought 
are of a piece, namely, the supposed parallel between intro­
spection and introspective reporting, and thought and speak­
ing. I will show that the traditional view of the relation 
of thought to speaking is misconceived and that thus the tra­
ditional concept of the relation of introspection to intro­
spective reporting must also be misconceived. Since I have 
already shown that introspection and thought are quite dif­
ferent, it may seem superfluous or irrelevant to go into this 
second matter. However, my emphasis will be on the relation­
ship between the inner and outer workings of language. I 
want to show that the inner and outer, or private and public.
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executions of our mental states are not linked in the way 
that philosophical tradition and naive supposition have it.
In line with traditional philosophy, we are inclined 
to think speaking dependent on thinking, that is, that "if 
the thought isn't there, you can't say it." If we say of 
someone that he spoke "without thinking," we mean that he 
didn't weigh his wcrd®:, and in such a case we often want to 
absolve him of some or all of the responsibility for what he 
said. But the important point is the suggestion, if we qual­
ify your words by saying you spoke "without thinking," that 
it is out of the ordinary to speak without thinking first, 
that usually speech repeats thought. And we have a connected 
belief, which is that while thinking may be verbalized, you 
do not have to "divulge your thoughts" unless you choose to.
But our ordinary experience belies our belief that 
(conscious) thought is necessary for speech. Think of the 
times that you have said something like "I don't like tea," 
only to realize with surprise that "I didn't know until I 
said it that I don't like tea. But I see now that I don't 
and never have." Very often we surprise ourselves with our 
pronouncements on subjects that (consciously) we have not 
thought about before.
Another, more compelling counterexample to the belief 
that thought is necessary for speech lies in our everyday way 
of conversing. It is rare for us to "stop and think" about
12what we are going to say in the give and take of conversation ;
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the usual case is that we simply talk, without thinking— or 
at least, without thinking of the sort supposed. Usually we 
do not "read off," or translate into words, thoughts. Think­
ing and speaking are different sorts of things, even though 
often what we say corresponds to what we are thinking and 
even though thoughts may be formed with the same words and 
even sentences that we later use in speech. But thinking is 
not a rehearsal for speaking (except unusually— think of anx­
iously rehearsing an a p o l o g y ) a n d  speaking is not an airing 
of a completed and private process.
Nevertheless, I am not suggesting that thinking and 
talking have nothing in common. Language is common to (con­
scious) thought and to speech; indeed, this link causes us 
to believe that thinking and talking are more alike than they 
are. When we look at mental states other than thought— say, 
anger, sexual desire, or a lasting hatred— we see that such 
mental states are not at all like talk. The feeling of anger 
is not like "I am angry with you"; the thought "I am angry 
with him" is much more like the spoken sentence than the 
feeling that it describes or avows. The discrepancy between 
most mental states and our talk about them reflects the fact 
that the former do not use words— are not "put into words"—  
whereas the latter does use words. The difference is quite 
significant, for when we put those mental states into words—  
whether in thought or in speech— they become conscious, and 
when we do not put those states into words, they remain 
unconscious.
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In comparison to speech, many of our thoughts are 
vague and incomplete. Many thoughts are like the speeches 
of the flighty Lily Tomlin character who, in the course of a 
long and ecstatic monologue, cannot complete one sentence.
We somehow understand the monologue, because the monologue . 
is a verbalization of the sporadically articulate and free- 
associative pattern that our thoughts often assume. Usually 
thoughts are not in sentences. Thoughts usually balance on 
the rim of consciousness, leaning now in toward conscious­
ness, now away into unconsciousness, depending upon the de­
gree to which the thought is put into words. Measured 
against what in this context is the grammatical ideal of 
speech, thought cannot be considered an inner blueprint for 
talk. So far as the use of language goes, writing is much 
closer to talk than thinking is.
One example of the relationship between thought and 
speech is this^®; You come over to my house and you ask me 
any one or several of these questions: "Why do you keep 
looking out the window?" "Why are you so fidgety?" "Why 
won't you come with me to dinner?" "Why are you so dressed 
up?" My answer to each of these questions is" "I'm ex­
pecting Jack." The traditional theory of the relation of 
thought to talk would be absurd here, for it is not the case 
that I have been thinking these words to myself: "I'm ex­
pecting Jack," and that your question or questions prompted 
me to repeat my thought out loud. My expecting Jack takes
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the form of my performing several activities, such as looking 
out the window for his car, restlessly pacing, and having put 
on my best dress. My expecting Jack is the reason that I can­
not accept your dinner invitation. My expecting Jack means 
that I am ready to avow at any time that I am expecting him.
An objection here might be that expecting is not a 
thought, and of course it is not. But if traditional theory 
suggests that talk is the expressing of a thought process, 
then the mental state "expecting" would have to be translated 
into a thought before being translated into a public declara­
tion of expecting. And this is wrong. The example clearly 
shows that all sorts of activities prompt one, when ques­
tioned, to provide the unhesitating explanation: "I am ex­
pecting Jack.” Think of the jilted lover who upon being be­
rated for refusing to leave the house says (to her own sur­
prise) : "But I'm hoping Bill will call." Consciously, she
was not hoping that Bill would call; she had no hope left, 
or so she thought. Yet her painfully unhesitating and sur­
prising statement shows that indeed she has been hoping that 
Bill will call and that she will be home to receive the call. 
There need not be conscious thoughts preceding our state­
ments. Our statements are provoked by or arise from many 
sorts of activities and states.
Our talk about our states and activities is intro­
spective talk.^^ Introspective talk— or an introspective 
report— performs in the way that we wanted to believe that
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the supposed partnership between thought and talk performs.
I have suggested that while in some circumstances, e.g., when 
one mentally devises and rehearses an apology, conscious 
thought corresponds to speech, far more often conscious 
thought consists of the identifying of an emotion or the 
sudden making of a decision. Furthermore, speech almost al­
ways occurs without conscious thoughts preceding it. The 
phenomenon that the supposed relationship of thinking to 
speech was believed to explain is introspection— but not a 
concept of introspection modelled on that of the traditional 
concept of thought. Not only is speech not a public expres­
sing of thought, but introspective reporting is not a public 
copying of introspection. In the previous section, I claimed 
that introspection was not a thinking about a (conscious) 
mental state, but rather a being set to act in some way with 
reference to that (conscious) mental state. This being set 
to act may result in the introspective report.
The introspective report is peculiarly linguistic—  
and so, of course, is conscious thought, as traditionally 
seen, that is, as the blueprint for speech. And it may seem 
that introspection and thought function similarly, providing 
the scripts for the introspective report and for speech.
But neither relationship works this way. Phenomena such as 
mental rehearsing, mulling, and the conscious parts of the 
evolving of an idea give us the belief that conscious thought 
is the basis for speech: if we do not seem to think before
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we speak, we reason, then surely the explanation is that the 
thoughts occurred too quickly for us to catch hold of. But 
this belief is wrong. We have seen that conscious thought 
is not necessary to speech. Still, this wrong picture of 
the relationship of thought to speech distorts our picture 
of the relationship of introspection to introspective re­
porting. To see an analogy there is to duplicate the prob­
lems inherent in the traditional view of thought and speech. 
I suggest that introspection is a being set to avow a state 
and the avowal, the introspective report, is our guarantee 
that the state is conscious. A mental state becomes con­
scious when it is introspected, that is, when I am enough 
aware of it that I put it into words. The thought is not 
truly conscious until it is explicitly put into words— and 
this is far more easily accomplished by speech (and writing) 
than by thinking. It is too easy, when thinking, to drift 
over transitions, to substitute image for word, phrase, and 
sentence. Only the explicit use of language can render a 
mental state conscious. As I stated previously, most (sup­
posedly conscious) thoughts float in and out of conscious­
ness; introspective reporting locks them into consciousness. 
Of course one can reflect on one's state, but this is not 
introspection. Generally, introspection is not thinking 
about one's mental state; it is a recognition of one's men­
tal state that takes the form of avowal. This avowal is 
not— at least, not usually— the result of a (prior) decision
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to avow it; indeed, the avowal can be a statement that sur­
prises the speaker, like the statement, "I am hoping that 
Bill will call."
.At least two results follow from this characteriza­
tion of introspection. First, only language-users can have 
conscious mental states. Only language-users introspect, for 
only language-users have the ability to affirm in speech their 
state. Only those states that can be affirmed by language 
can be considered conscious. If you cannot tell me what you 
are feeling or thinking, then your state must be unconscious. 
In Section One (Chapter II), I correlated having a conscious 
mental state (x) with being aware of mental state (x). In 
Section Two, I showed that introspection characterizes all 
conscious mental states. In this section, I have shown that 
introspection is best viewed as the ability— that is, being 
set— verbally to avow a mental state. Therefore, being aware 
of mental state m is equivalent to being able verbally to 
avow mental state m.
We attribute mental states to non-language-users.
For example, we say "Fido is jealous because I'm sitting so
close to you," or "Spot thinks he gets to go with us." But
we cannot say that these mental states are conscious, because
Fido and Spot cannot be aware, in an introspective way, of
18their mental states. It is unexceptionable to attribute 
desires and beliefs to dumb animals. We say of the dog who 
lunges for the door when we show him the leash; "Fido wants
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to go out." If pressed ("Why on earth would he want to go 
out— it's freezing out there."), we might say, "He loves to 
play in the snow." We would say this for the reasons that 
1) Fido acts as if he wants to go outside, and 2) it seems 
that the explanation for his behavior must be what the ex­
planation for our behavior would be if we lunged for the 
door when our father brings up the sled from the basement; 
we love to play in the snow. One of our most primitive re­
sponses is investing others with our feelings. Recall the 
two-year-old girl who heard the dog's yelps and who said, 
"Poor doggy." There is no real problem in attributing feel­
ings to animals on the basis of their behavior— for their 
behavior approximates that of human beings, and we correctly 
attribute feelings to other people on the basis of their be­
havior. Rather, the problem arises when we wonder if the 
feelings of animals are just like our (conscious, intro­
spectible) feelings. We want to say that Fido's desire to 
go outside is like ours when we want eagerly to go out. We 
want to infer from the relationship between our mental state 
(wanting to go out) and our behavior (going for the door) to 
a relationship between Fido's mental state (wanting to go 
out)— which we must attribute to him— and Fido's behavior 
(going for the door) . This is understandable but dangerous 
for a theory of mind. For our mental state may not be any­
thing like thinking "I want to go out," which is what na­
ively we suppose to be "going on in our mind" when it is the
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case that we want to go out. My wanting to go out may, 
given the situation, just be my glancing out the window, 
then donning my coat and going to the door. My conscious 
wanting to go out is shown by my response to your asking me 
why I am putting on my coat: "I want to go out.” The par­
allel with Fido can extend only to the similar behavior in­
volved— which is quite sufficient to justify our saying 
"Fido wants to go out" as easily as our saying "Dianne wants 
to go out." But there is no canine parallel for the intro­
spective avowal: "I want to go out."
The distinction between conscious and unconscious 
mental states has nothing to do with the expressiveness or 
complicatedness of the behavior involved. It has to do with 
expressing in language the mental state that motivates or 
explains or describes the behavior. Much complex behavior 
is unconsciously motivated, that is,, is prompted by beliefs 
and desires that the subject is not set to avow. Suppose 
that you are the jilted lover who refuses to leave the house 
and that you cannot give us any (good) reason for refusing 
to go out. We say, "If you're hoping Bill will call. . ." 
and you say, "I know he won't call; that's not the reason.
I just don't want to go." Your not being set to avow your 
mental state (because you are self-deceived) means that your 
mental state is unconscious; if you cannot tell us your 
state, then your state is unconscious.
This brings me to the second result of my
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characterization of introspection: namely, that the intro­
spective report is our guarantee that your state is con­
scious. If you avow mental state m(x), then we have evi­
dence that you are aware of x. But, you may object, what 
about behavior?— surely behavior counts as evidence for, 
say, sexual desire. For often behavior is so clearly in­
dicative of a certain mental state that your denial of that 
state could not possibly count as evidence for your state 
of mind. But however expressively your behavior indicates 
mental state m(x), behavior cannot count as evidence for 
your being aware of x. The dog's pitiful yelps in the vet's 
office clearly show his fear, but they do not show that he 
is aware of his fear. If you cannot avow mental state (x) 
(say, you deny (x) or avow (y) or cannot say anything at 
all), then we cannot say that you are aware of x. And if 
you are not aware of x, then m(x) is not conscious.
Only in language-users do we find discrepancies be­
tween what one says and how he acts, that is, between his 
awareness of (x) ("I love you") and his behavior as if (y) 
("I hate you"). It is easy to see why this is the case. 
Behavior is all that we have to judge non-language-users 
by; non-language-users cannot contradict themselves by 
claiming to feel one way and acting as if they feel another 
way. We must interpret language-users, when they contra­
dict themselves, by balancing their avowals against their 
behavior. Fido cannot say, "On the one hand. I'd like to
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stay in here and warm myself by the fire; on the other I'd 
like even more to go out and cavort in the snow." The con­
cept of contradiction is a concept that arises from the use 
of language. Rationality, reconciliation, logic are the 
demands with which language and consciousness confront us.
The desires of a dog do not have to be reconciled; Fido 
acts in accordance with whatever beliefs and desires moti­
vate him most strongly at the time. Dogs seem straight­
forward ("I'd rather have a good dog than a woman anytime; 
a dog won't lie and won't try to use me."); people dissem­
ble. But the dog's "straightforwardness" has no moral 
value, as does a person's, for the dog cannot but be straight­
forward— he cannot use language, he has no conscious mental 
states. Moreover, we language-users are self-deceivers be­
cause we must try to reconcile our actions and our reasons 
for our actions with our conscious beliefs and desires. And 
this can be problematic, because our actions may in fact be 
prompted by all sorts of unconscious and conflicting beliefs 
and desires. The ability to use language, which produces 
conscious mental states, is the basis of the discrepancies 
we find between our behavior and our explanations for our 
behavior.
It has been held traditionally that introspective 
reports are incorrigible; but, as we will see in the next 
chapter, we can give introspective reports that are wrong.
It seems, from the discussion above, that the reason for
65
this is the inability introspectively to account for our un­
conscious mental states. What is it about introspective re­
ports that makes them seem unchallengeable and that yet we 
challenge?
Incorrigibility and Introspection
The concepts of infallibility and incorrigibility are 
closely linked with the concept of introspection and are often 
confused with each other. Here I will distinguish them; the 
way in which I do so will suit my own purposes but will, I 
think, be fair.
It has been said that it is impossible for (sincere) 
first-person psychological statements to be mistaken. The 
reasoning behind this is that only the person making the in­
trospective report has the special access to his mind that 
enables him to "see" his thoughts. Only that person knows, 
first-hand, what he is thinking; only he has the transcript 
of his thoughts in his mind's eye. Since the introspective 
report is merely the verbal reproduction of a private mental 
script, the person making the report must be considered infal­
lible; and it must be that his (sincere) introspective re­
ports guarantee their own truth.
But earlier, I rejected a major link in this line of 
reasoning when I denied that the introspective report is a 
sort of reading aloud of a person's thoughts. I pointed out 
that very often we discover our own thoughts by talking and 
that only in special circumstances do we repeat our thoughts
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out loud. It seems odd to say that we are logically infal­
lible authorities on our mental states if we can surprise 
ourselves by stating our thoughts.
Another, more telling objection to the notion that 
introspective reports are infallible is this: When I do not
challenge your introspective claim, my reason is not that I 
believe your claim to be infallible, but rather that I have 
no reason to doubt your claim. If I should challenge you, 
my reasons will be practical, not logical. I will say, "If 
you're so happy to be divorced, why do you cry all the time?" 
The applicability of the concept of logical infallibility is 
undercut by the type of grounds that we in fact use for chal­
lenging an introspective claim: we challenge your claim if
it is at odds with your behavior or if it is strange in view
19of your circumstances. We do not challenge your claim in 
spite of the logical impossibility that it be mistaken; we 
challenge it in spite of our intuitive and usual assumption 
that you are not wrong.
The argument for incorrigibility, like that for in­
fallibility, is based on the claim that we have privileged 
access to our own minds. But the claim of incorrigibility 
provides only that, if we have no evidence to the contrary, 
we must accept your introspective report. We might charac­
terize the notion of privileged access as the belief that so 
far as your own mind goes, you are the only sighted person 
in the world. The proponent of the claim that introspective
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reports are infallible would draw from this characterization 
the statement that, if you are the only person who can see 
X, then you are of necessity the unimpeachable authority for 
X. Others have to take your word. But the proponent of the 
argument for incorrigibility would say that while it may be 
the case that you are the only sighted person in the world
and that only you can say, "I see a tree ahead of me," never­
theless, others can check your report. They cannot check 
your claim by looking, but they can go touch the tree, or 
smell it, or hear it in the wind. There are certain checks 
available to others that may be used to challenge your claim. 
When others accept your claim they are not crediting you with 
logical infallibility, but with (a limited) authority.
But surely it makes no sense to say— as I seem to—  
that while your introspective report is incorrigible, never­
theless it may be w r o n g . B u t  that is what I wish to claim. 
However, I want to take the intuitive belief that ordinarily 
an introspective claim is unchallengeable and tie this belief 
not to the truth or falsity of the claim, or to the rightness 
or wrongness of the claim, but to the awareness the person 
who makes the claim has of his mental state. We believe
strongly that you have the authoritative word on your own
mental states; just as strongly, we believe ourselves some­
times justified in challenging that word. By locating incor­
rigibility in your awareness of your mental state, we do jus­
tice to both beliefs.
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Let us look at some examples of introspective
reports.
If Arnold claims that, during the day that he— bound 
and gagged— spent locked in the closet while his kidnappers 
demanded and received a ransom, he felt no fear, but rather 
alternated between frustration at his helplessness and a sort 
of curiosity or surprise that such a thing had happened to 
him— well, generally we accept his claim. We know that 
Arnold is a stolid man; we know that his wife loves him and 
has the money to pay the ransom, and we know that Arnold 
knows this; we know that Arnold does not lie; and we know 
that Arnold is above average in his ability to recognize his 
feelings. We also know that the kidnappers were not rough 
with Arnold. All these factors argue against our discrediting 
Arnold's statement that he felt no fear during his captivity—  
even though the situation Arnold.found himself in is one that 
is likely to produce fear in most kidnappées and Arnold's re­
sponse is not the usual one.
But suppose that Arnold is in the 7-11 during a hold­
up. Suppose that there has been a series of 7-11 hold-ups in 
town and that three people have been killed so far in these 
hold-ups. In Arnold's case, the store employee is killed and 
Arnold is threatened with the gun. The next day Arnold tells 
us that he felt no fear. We are incredulous. For in this 
case, Arnold's wealth and loving wife do not increase his odds 
for survival; they are irrelevant. Even Arnold's celebrated
69
honesty and stolidity of temperament, and his sensitivity to 
the subtleties of his mental state, do not counter the 
strangeness of his reaction to the hold-up. We ask Arnold 
what he did feel. "Well, actually, I felt nothing except a 
sort of heaviness, an apathy." Arnold's wife says that 
Arnold had the shakes the rest of the day and nightmares all 
night. What do we say now?
Do we say: "The oddness of your reaction to the sit­
uation, coupled with your behavior after the fact shows that, 
while you felt nothing during the robbery, nevertheless you 
were afraid." Or do we say: "You should have been very much
afraid, Arnold. Anyone with any sense would have been afraid. 
You are sensible. You probably were afraid, but didn't show
it until afterwards." (This is what we might have said after
Arnold gave us his account of his feelings during his being 
held for ransom— except that we had no reason to doubt
Arnold's account except for its oddness. But it wasn't that
odd. It was odd enough for us to challenge, but his expla­
nation satisfied us.) Or do we say: "You weren't afraid
until afterwards, when you thought about it." Or, perhaps: 
"You don't experience fear the way most of us do. For you 
fear takes the form of lassitude. Remember last summer when 
you fell out of the boat and plummeted to the bottom of the 
lake? We fished you out, revived you. We asked you what 
you, a non-swimmer, had felt as you sank. You replied that 
you had felt no fear, but rather a sort of lassitude. We
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said: 'Resignation?' You said: 'No. I had no thoughts
about death, I made no decisions. I was in a blind thrall 
of torpor.' So it seems probable that in situations that 
would elicit recognizable fear from most of us, you feel las­
situde. And feeling that is how you experience fear."
Suppose Herbie goes to the bank, which is then held
up by three machine-gun-toting bank robbers. A camera films
the robbery, and Herbie gets particularly good coverage, by
both the camera and a machine-gun-pointing robber. That
night we ask Herbie what he felt. He says, with a touch of
pride: "Oddly enough, I felt exhilarated." We watch the
footage of the robbery on the news. There is Herbie. Herbie
looks ill. Herbie is grinning with maniacal terror. "Come
on, Herbie," we say. "You look like a man who thinks he's
going to die. You look scared to death." "I look afraid,"
agrees Herbie. "But I did not feel in the least afraid."
We might accept that, especially if Herbie's hobbies include
21sky-diving and stock-car racing. But some of us might 
still say: "Your fear disguised itself as exhilaration dur­
ing the hold-up. The exhilaration was a means of coping with 
a situation that terrified you."
If the introspective report is supposed to be incor­
rigible, then surely it can be said to function as a means 
22of identifying one's mental states. But it seems that 
one's identification reasonably can be challenged, when one 
of at least these two cases holds: The first case occurs
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when the account you give of your mental state is not appro­
priate, given the situation. Your behavior is consistent 
with your account of your feelings, but given the circum­
stances, neither the behavior nor the account is appropriate. 
The second case arises when the introspective account is be­
lied by your behavior. Here, the report can make sense, can 
be appropriate, but your behavior is at odds with your ac­
count of your feelings. If either condition holds, we may 
invite you to qualify or correct your introspective account.
The first type of case is rarer: it is easier for
people to call you on; and it is more difficult philosophi­
cally to explain, because of the question: What is meant by
behavior being appropriate to a situation? The charge 
against you, if we charge you with inappropriate behavior, 
is that your behavior is not what we should expect. This is 
not to claim that there is a correct way, a standard way, to 
react to every situation. It is to claim that, things being 
what they are in the world of human beings, there are certain 
ill-defined lines of action and reaction that we would pre­
dict for certain situations— and situations like those situ­
ations. When your behavior and introspective account devi­
ate from what we would have expected (had we thought about
it), we respond to you in ways that range from vague dis-
23quiet to gaping disbelief. The behavior that we expect we 
call "normal"; those lines of conduct that we would have pre­
dicted are "norms."
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The closer your behavior approximates those norms, 
the less inclined we are to challenge your verbal corrobo­
ration of that behavior. We are a community of judges of 
behavior. But we are lenient judges: we will acknowledge
all sorts of extenuating circumstances and accept all sorts 
of reasons for your strange behavior and your stubborn 
avowal of strange feelings prompting that behavior. We look 
at your personality, your history, your circumstances; we 
weigh your sincerity; we have faith in your mystery and 
complexity.
We are doubtful at first of Arnold's account of his 
reaction to the kidnapping, but after we have considered all 
the factors, we become, if not satisfied, unable to press 
our disquiet. We think: "His version doesn't seem quite
right, but then, he doesn't get rattled easily and they were 
gentle with him." We let it go. But Arnold's account of 
the 7-11 robbery-murder provokes sure— yet perhaps vague—  
disbelief. Our disbelief is based on the feeling that 
Arnold's behavior is not at all what we should expect. Af­
ter he repeatedly assures us that he felt apathetic through­
out the ordeal, we believe that he felt apathetic but not 
that he really was apathetic. If a witness corroborates 
Arnold's account of himself, we are denied the move we made 
in Herbie's case; we cannot argue that all the evidence ex­
cept his testimonial points to his being afraid. The witness 
says: "He just stood there." Or: "I thought that he thought
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it was best to go along with the robber, that it was less 
dangerous that way." Or: "He looked bored. I couldn't
understand it. I was so afraid that I couldn't stop crying." 
But in spite of the consistency of Arnold's report with his 
behavior, we would say that apathy is inappropriate in re­
sponse to such a situation and so Arnold's claim of apathy 
is suspect. It is not suspect for the reason that we doubt 
his sincerity or even his perspicacity. We are persuaded, 
even, that apathy what Arnold felt. But we still want to 
argue that Arnold's response really was fear. A point on our 
side— which would not be present in every case— is that 
Arnold seems to respond with feelings of lassitude to other 
situations that call for fear.
Arnold's introspective report is incorrigible in that 
his awareness of his mental state at the time was of apathy. 
But still we are inclined to say that in some sense Arnold's 
claim of apathy is wrong. Arnold's claim does not ring true. 
And yet, if we cannot give a reason for our disbelief or un­
ease, we may go on record with qualifications, but we must 
let his claim stand.
The second type of case in which an introspective 
report is open to challenge is one that we are often called 
upon to judge. In this type of case, your account may or 
may not be appropriate for the situation but it at odds 
with your behavior. Herbie claims that he was exhilarated 
by the bank robbery, but his filmed responses are not
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consistent with what our practiced idea of exhilaration
looks like. Herbie's behavior leads us to think that he was
25very nervous and upset, and such behavior is appropriate. 
Herbie's behavior fits the situation, but his introspective 
report fits neither his behavior nor his situation. In 
Herbie's case more so than in Arnold's, we wonder about sin­
cerity; we might whisper among ourselves: "You know how
macho Herbie is; he doesn't want us to know he was scared." 
But if we think that probably Herbie is sincere, what do we 
say? Everything, including his behavior, points away from 
his account of his feelings. How can we account for this?
We might say that while exhilaration is not wholly 
appropriate to the situation Herbie found himself in, never­
theless such a reaction is no stranger than Arnold's reac­
tion to being shut up in a closet by kidnappers— and we ac­
cepted Arnold's account of his feelings there. We might 
claim that Herbie's situation is like Arnold's kidnapping, 
and that Arnold's claim of frustration at being tied up and 
his sense of surprise at being at the center of an adventure 
were unusual, but not wrong, as his apathy at the 7-11 was.
We might say that we know of people who respond to danger
26with "a flow of adrenalin," in which they use their fear 
efficiently; sometimes this response takes the form of ex­
hilaration, and we do not question accounts that claim this 
response. If Evel Kneivel were to say that danger exhila­
rates him, we would not argue with him. We might call him
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crazy, or brave, or different; in doing this we are acknowl­
edging that his response is not "normal” (hence initially it 
is open to doubt), but nevertheless is correct (for after 
consideration we believe him). But we would have to admit 
that this type of case corresponds to Arnold's cases, where 
our doubt is directed to Arnold's whole response (verbal and 
behavioral) and not to Herbie's case, where we doubt just his 
report. Herbie acted afraid; but he insists that he was ex­
hilarated. The person whose claim of exhilaration during 
danger we would accept does not act afraid. If he does, we 
say, "You were afraid." We say to Herbie, "You may have 
thought you were exhilarated, but you were afraid. You 
should have been afraid, you acted afraid; therefore, no mat­
ter what you say, really you were afraid."
But the usual case is that we do not challenge your
introspective report. Usually, your report reveals a mental
state that is in harmony with your behavior and appropriate
to the situation. In such cases we take your word; we do
not question you when your introspective report corroborates
what we should have thought your mental state to be. In the
usual case an introspective report yields as unchallengeable
27an identification as we could wish for. Even in slightly 
unusual cases, after questioning you, we give your intro­
spective report the benefit of the doubt: When Arnold in­
sists that during the kidnapping he felt only surprise and 
frustration, then, with some reservation, we accept his
76
claim. We have weighed the evidence other than his report—  
his personality, his treatment, and so forth— and that evi­
dence inclines us in favor of the rather strange report.
But in really bizarre cases, our prejudice in favor of the 
introspective report is outweighed by one or both of these 
two things: our sifting through the evidence, and our in­
tuitive assessment of the overall situation. When Arnold 
claims that he felt apathetic during the hold-up, we are 
baffled, because such a reaction is counterintuitive. In 
the end, we decide that he felt apathetic— and so his intro­
spective report is correct— but that really he was afraid.
In Herbie's case, we finally believe Herbie's claim that his 
mental state was exhilaration during the robbery, but, again, 
we believe that Herbie really was afraid.
What are we doing in those unusual situations when 
we distinguish between your introspected state and your 
"real" state, between your claiming that you did not feel 
fear and our believing that you were afraid. We are giving 
your introspective report credit and at the same time we are 
limiting its scope. We are recognizing that so far as your 
conscious mental states go, your report is correct and thus 
finally unchallengeable; but (it may be said) we are also 
recognizing that in the context of the situation your report 
is bizarre. The bizarreness of your report gives us reason 
to doubt the completeness of your assessment of your state. 
An appeal to an unconscious mental state can satisfy our
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desire to make your report fit into an understandable whole. 
As Freud said, the reason— and the compulsion— for assuming 
unconscious mental states is that their influence explains 
much otherwise inexplicable behavior. When we say that yes, 
you may have felt apathetic but "really" you were afraid, we 
are recognizing that unconscious states can foul up what 
ought to be the smooth functioning and interlocking of situ­
ation, response, and report. Sometimes the mental state that 
is introspected is in drag, so that introspection, in iden­
tifying the (disguised) conscious state is misidentifying the 
"true" unconscious state. We introspect only those states 
that are conscious, that we are aware of.
Perhaps Arnold is a man who must be in control— of 
himself, of his situation— at all times. Perhaps his sto­
lidity in those situations in which control is effectively 
denied him is an attempt at least to control his feelings. 
Perhaps his lassitude is terror, not so much of guns and 
kidnappers as much as of being manipulated, victimized, of 
being at someone else's mercy; perhaps, further, his lassi­
tude is terror disguised in a way that he can bear. If we 
view Arnold's case in this way, we say that Arnold's apathy 
is appropriate in view of his unconscious mental states.
Sometimes the introspective account need not be bi­
zarre, may in fact be a sufficient explanation for an action 
that is appropriate— and yet we may want to assume an uncon­
scious companion motive. For excimple, he: "I knew you were
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trying to seduce me when you came out in that outfit." She 
(indignant); "I was not trying to seduce you. I told you,
I just wanted to change into something more comfortable than 
that dress I wore to dinner." Many actions lend themselves 
to a variety of explanations, any one of which might be suf­
ficient. This is one reason that we can challenge a report
even if it does sufficiently account for an appropriate ac-
28tion— as in the case above. The overdetermination of be­
havior also accounts for the opposite of seeing a person's 
behavior differently than he sees it, namely, our usual ac­
ceptance of introspective reports. We are inclined to accept 
your report, for the state that you are aware of usually ac­
counts satisfactorily for your behavior.
Your introspective report is not incorrigible in the 
sense that it is a necessarily true account of your state. 
Rather, your introspective report is. incorrigible in that it 
assures the ultimate unchallengeability of your report of 
your conscious mental state. This is most clearly the case 
with mental states such as sensations and feelings : At some
point in our interrogation, Herbie's insistence that he felt 
exhilarated becomes unchallengeable. We say, however hesi­
tantly, "Well, anyway, he must have felt exhilarated." Your 
introspective report seems more challengeable than Herbie's 
when you are reporting a belief or motive or intention. When 
you say, "I only wanted to get comfortable. I assure you 
that I had no intention of seducing you," you are more
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vulnerable to challenge than Herbie in that with intentions 
and motives contraindicative behavior counts heavily against 
you. If you are ready— however little you realize it— to 
seduce ypur date, he is warned of it by your behavior, and 
your protests serve only to make you seem coy. In the case 
of beliefs and intentions and motives, the introspective re­
port may have to be qualified: "At the time, all I was
thinking was 'If I don't get out of this dress and these 
shoes. I'll die.' But the more I think about it, the more I 
see that I was hoping you'd make a move that evening. So I 
suppose that I was trying to be provocative." Later reflec­
tion and discussion may shed new light on the beliefs that 
we have of ourselves and our intentions. Such reflection 
yields less qualification in the case of emotions, however. 
The most Arnold can say now is: "I see that actually it was
fear that made me act that way, not boredom. Still, I felt 
bored." But however we later qualify what "must have been 
going on," the introspective report is unassailable in this 
respect: introspection reveals what you were aware of at the
time. That is what the introspective report gives us; it is 
not a complete accounting of a person's mental life at any 
moment; it is simply an authoritative statement of a person's 
conscious mental state, and functions therefore as either a 
satisfying account or a clue toward one.
"Unconscious" and "Unaware"
In Section One, I followed D.C. Dennett in limiting
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"aware” to intentional idioms and "conscious" to non- 
intentional idioms. Still following Dennett, I divided 
awareness into two categories: awareness^, which involves
introspective reporting, and awareness2 , which involves be­
havior control. Then I distinguished among our three uses
of "conscious," and linked these uses to the two ways we use
"aware": For one to be merely conscious, one must be awareg
of x; and for one to be awarOg of x, one must be conscious. 
For one to be a conscious being, one must be capable of 
awareness^ of x; that is, one must be capable of providing 
an introspective report of m(x). Finally, for one to have a
conscious mental state m(x), one must be aware^ of x; that
is, one must be ready to give us an introspective report of 
m(x) .
I wish now to discuss "unaware" and "unconscious."
I will limit "unaware," like "aware," to intentional idioms, 
and "unconscious," like "conscious," to non-intentional idi­
oms. I permit, "Deep in thought, she was unaware of the ap­
proaching storm," but not, "Deep in thought, she was uncon- 
scious of the approaching storm.""" In the case of non- 
intentional expressions, only "unconscious" sounds right; we 
cannot substitute "unaware" for "unconscious" in the follow­
ing sentences: "He is still unconscious"; "His love for her
is unconscious." "Unaware" insists on being intentional; it 
demands to be followed by an "of" or "that." The only case 
in which "unaware" stands alone is when we use it to mean
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"unawares," as in "He caught her unaware(s)."
So "unaware" and "unconscious" follow their contraries 
in the ease with which we can limit them, one to intentional 
uses and the other to non-intentional uses. But beyond this 
initial pairing-off, the contrasts that we would suppose to 
hold in every case between "aware" and "unaware," and between 
"conscious" and "unconscious," exist only in most instances. 
For example, when we want the contrast to the "conscious" in 
"A human being is a conscious creature," we do not find a use 
of "unconscious" such as "A rock is an unconscious creature." 
We do not even say, "A rock is an unconscious thing." We 
might say that a rock is a "non-conscious" thing, which im­
plies, rightly, that there just is no useful contrast be­
tween the "conscious" in "conscious creature" and "uncon­
scious." Or we might call a rock "an inanimate object"; and 
this implies not a conscious/unconscious distinction but 
rather a sentient/non-sentient distinction. But calling hu­
man beings "conscious beings" is meant to imply a faculty 
different from and higher than mere sentience. The nebulous 
concept of "conscious creature" is tied up in our mythology 
with the concepts of "rational being" and "soul." The tra­
ditional belief was that the set of those who possess con­
sciousness (conscious beings) is coextensive with the set of 
those who possess the power of rational thought and also is 
coextensive with the set of those who have souls: this set
was believed to be composed exclusively of the set of human
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beings. (There were some qualified exceptions allowed, such 
as dead infants, and some qualified inclusions permitted, 
such as angels.) Further, if we look to the nonhuman animal 
world for a contrast to "conscious being," we are faced with 
the absurdity of calling sentient creatures such as dogs and 
giraffes "unconscious beings." Dogs and giraffes are uncon­
scious when they are drugged or knocked out, but even then 
they are not "unconscious beings." There is just no good 
sense to be made of the concept of "unconscious being."
"Unconscious" does have a good use when we contrast 
it to our use of "conscious" in "He is conscious now." If 
he is not conscious, he is unconscious— that is, passed out, 
or in a coma. We recognize shades in this use of "conscious" 
and "unconscious": we say, "He is regaining consciousness" 
and "He is coming to," to describe the grey states between 
alert full consciousness and oblivious unconsciousness.
The third sense of "unconscious" is contrasted with 
the "conscious" whose omission characterizes certain mental 
states. Here, we assume that the mental state is conscious 
unless we are told otherwise. Ordinarily, we do not say, 
"Ralph consciously destroyed Ann's career"; rather, we say, 
"Ralph destroyed Ann's c a r e e r , a n d  the unspoken under­
standing is that Ralph destroyed Ann's career not uncon­
sciously, that is, that he was aware that he was doing so.
We may suppose that Ralph was (at least fairly) straight­
forward (at least to himself) about his beliefs and desires
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(and perhaps motives); "Nothing but the destruction of her 
career will satisfy me." "If I tell them that she served 
time in jail for embezzlement, they'll refuse to hire her." 
And so forth.
If in such a case we do use the adverb "consciously," 
we mean and are taken to mean "knowingly" (in keeping with 
the etymology of "conscious") or, less plausibly (i.e., with 
less authority) but more usually, "deliberately." When we 
say, "A consciously did x," we mean something like "A did x 
knowing full well what he was doing," that is, something dif­
ferent from simply "A did x" (i.e., not unconsciously). The 
use of "consciously" often carries a moral or legal flavor: 
When we say that A "consciously" did x, we are informing you 
that the action was performed in such a way as to assign some 
sort of culpability to the subject. We say, "Ralph con­
sciously destroyed her career," and we mean that Ralph delib­
erately destroyed her career. But saying this is quite dif­
ferent from saying that Ralph did x (merely) consciously 
(i.e., not unconsciously). Consider the claim, "Ralph uncon­
sciously destroyed her career." Here we mean (simply) that 
Ralph was not aware of his intention to sabotage Ann's career. 
(Ralph says, quite reasonably and apparently sincerely, "But 
as an officer of the bank, I had to inform the directors that 
she had been convicted of embezzlement.") While it is true 
that "unconsciously" is often used to release the subject of 
the action from culpability, to excuse him, nevertheless.
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"unconscious" is the "trouser" word here^^: When neither
"consciously" nor "unconsciously" is used to modify the 
verb, we mean that the action was done in the usual (not un­
conscious) way; we mean that Ralph was in a position to avow 
that he was destroying Ann's career. When "unconsciously" is 
used, we mean that the subject was not aware of his action 
or state as such; we mean that Ralph was not in a position 
to report that he was destroying Ann's career, because of, 
say, self-deception about his feelings about Ann or about 
his motives for doing or having done certain things that con­
cerned Ann. But when "consciously" is used, not only do we 
mean that the subject was aware of what he was doing, but 
also we imply that he, say, acted without regard for the dan­
ger involved or for the ethics involved or for some expected 
consequence. "Unconsciously" has a purer use than 
"consciously."^^
In my view, a conscious mental state is a state that 
the subject is set to avow. But the use of "consciously" to 
mean "deliberately" inclines us to think of a conscious action 
as an intentional action (and not merely an action of which 
one is unaware) and, then, conversely, to think of an uncon­
scious action as an unintentional a c t i o n . B u t  since the 
use of "consciously" distorts the meaning of the concept of 
"conscious," and since the use of "unconsciously" corrobo­
rates the conscious/unconscious distinction based on aware­
ness, we should expect that the way we use "unintentionally,"
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on the one hand, and "unconsciously,” on the other, differ. 
And this is so.
The kind of thing that we can be said to be doing 
when we do something consciously or unconsciously is differ­
ent from the kind of thing that we can be said to be doing 
when we do something intentionally or unintentionally. If 
we say, "By doing x, he unintentionally hurt her," we are 
claiming that he hurt her as an inadvertent by-product of 
whatever else he was doing. If we say, "By doing x, he un­
consciously hurt her," we are claiming that he was unaware 
of his desire to hurt her, that the desire to hurt was uncon­
scious. But the difference is shown also in that we would 
not be likely to use the sentence construction of the first 
statement for the second. We would be more likely to put 
the second statement in this way; "He did x out of an uncon­
scious desire to hurt her." And here we clearly see that not 
only was he not doing the same thing when he hurt her out of 
an unconscious wish as he was doing when he hurt her unin­
tentionally, but that in fact in acting out his unconscious 
wish he was hurting her intentionally.
There are actions that can be done consciously or 
unconsciously, but not intentionally or unintentionally, and 
there are actions that can be done intentionally or uninten­
tionally but not consciously or unconsciously. You can hate 
your mother unconsciously but not unintentionally; you can 
unintentionally close the door on my foot, but you cannot
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unconsciously close the door on my foot. We use "deliber­
ately," "intentionally," and "unintentionally" to describe 
actions whose motive or purpose we might question; "He 
ruined my clean floor with his muddy shoes!" "I'm sure it 
was unintentional; he just never thinks about such things 
as clean floors." The question is not whether or not he 
muddied the floor, but whether or not he meant to. Again:
You arrive home earlier than I and go on to bed. You have 
locked me out of the house; I pound on the door and throw 
rocks at the bedroom window. You defend yourself: "I
wasn't thinking— I forgot that you had lost your key." Or:
"I didn't realize that the lock was on." Or, simply: "It
was an accident." There is no question that you locked me 
out. The question is: Did you do it on purpose? You say
no, of course not. I say: "But you always forget to look
to see if the lock is on, you are forever locking me out—  
you must mean to." It is only at this point, when we are 
stalemated, that the question arises whether or not you un­
consciously intend to lock me out; perhaps many actions that 
we initially classify as unintentional we later reclassify 
as intentional and unconsciously motivated. "Leave me alone, 
will you? I didn't mean to lock you out." "That's what you 
want— you want me to leave you alone. You want to be alone. 
That's why you always lock me out of the house." In such a 
case, if I believe that your action fulfilled a purpose, then 
I will have suggested the notion that the purpose was
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unconscious— but the question whether the purpose was uncon­
scious is different from the question whether the action was 
intentional.
To sum up the contrast between the three senses of 
"conscious” and "unconscious": The first sense of "con­
scious," where we talk of "conscious beings" has no con­
trasting use of "unconscious." The second sense of "con­
scious" has a contrast of equal stature in "unconscious":
"He is conscious now" vs. "He is still unconscious." (This 
sense provides the only case for which we use "unconscious­
ness": "He is slipping into unconsciousness" as opposed to
"He is regaining consciousness.") The third sense of "con­
scious" and its contrast "unconscious" is found in our char­
acterization of mental states. (This is derived from the 
first sense: It is only of conscious beings that we say,
"He did it consciously" or "He did it unconsciously.") This 
sense makes frequent use of the adverbial forms "consciously" 
and "unconsciously." "Conscious" in this sense depends on 
"unconscious": only with the introduction of the concept of
unconscious mental states is there an opposite impetus to 
think of mental states as conscious, and indeed, unless we 
explicitly characterize a state as unconscious, we assume 
that it is conscious. The presence of "conscious" is signi­
fied by its absence.
I wish to turn now from "conscious" and "unconscious" 
to "aware" and "unaware." "Unaware," unlike "unconscious,"
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is a fairly straightforward opposite to its contrary. Ear­
lier I distinguished "awareness^" from "awarenessg": the
first has to do with introspective reporting and is re­
stricted to language-users; the second has to do with be­
havior control and involves all sentient creatures. You are 
aware^ of x if your mental state involving x is conscious; 
you are capable of awareness^ of x if you are a conscious 
being; and you are awareg of x if you are conscious (e.g., 
not passed out) and react with reference to x.
If you are unaware^ of x, you may still be awareg of 
X. This will be the case, say, if you unconsciously resent 
your sister, or if you are a bee swerving past the tree in 
your path. If you are unaware^ of x, then either you are 
unconscious (say, knocked out) or unable for some other rea­
son to apprehend x (x may be a tree and you are a blind per­
son ten feet away from it; or x may he a tree and you are a 
rock lying at its base). The interesting case is the first, 
which gives us the unconscious mental state.
When you are unaware^ of a state, you are unable to 
avow that state; nevertheless you may act as if that state 
were the case. Both you and your sister go on a diet. You 
lose two pounds. Your sister loses fifteen pounds (and 
looks sensational). You say; "I'm so happy for you!" And 
you hand her the platter of onion dip and Fritoes, her fav­
orite snack, so that you two can "celebrate." When what you 
say you feel is inconsistent with your actions, we want to
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impute to you beliefs or motives or desires of which you are 
not aware^ but with which your behavior is consistent. If 
you are only aware2 of x, you are like the bee: you behave
appropriately with respect to x, but you are unable to avow 
m(x). You cannot say: "I gave her the dip and chips be­
cause I resent her weight loss” any more than the bee can 
say: "I swerved because I didn't want to hit the tree.”
I want to turn now to the examination of a situation 
that will serve as an^ analogy for my thesis that the uncon­
scious mental state is one of which I am unaware^, but 
awarog, a state, that is, which I cannot avow but which my 
behavior corroborates.
NOTES
^It is interesting that "conscious" and its deriva­
tives, and "aware" and its derivatives, have evolved from 
two very different sources. The adjective "conscious" de­
rives quite straightforwardly from two Latin words, "com"
(with) and "scire" (to know), and its archaic meaning is 
this: "sharing another's knowledge or awareness of an in­
ward state or outward fact." The adjective "aware" comes 
from the Middle English "iwar," which comes from the old 
English "gewar," the word that spawned not only "aware," but 
also "wary." "Ge" is an associative-prefix and "waer" is de­
fined as "wary." Under the listing for "wary," not only are 
the Middle English "war" and "ware" and Old English "ware" 
given as etyma, but also the Old High German "giwar," and the 
Latin "vereri" (to fear) and the Greek "horan" (to see). The 
archaic meaning of "aware" is "watchful."
The noun "conscious" is used to mean "consciousness" 
when defined as "the upper level of mental life as contrasted 
with unconscious processes." "Aware" has no parallel use; 
however, the nouns "consciousness" and "awareness," like 
their adjectival forms, are used interchangeably. Note, 
though, that "consciousness" is given a listing separate from 
"conscious," and has listed five current uses or definitions, 
whereas "awareness" is merely listed under the entry for 
"aware," as the noun form of "aware." The weight given "con­
sciousness" by the dictionary is corroborated by our everyday 
use of "consciousness" as synonymous with "mind," whereas we 
think of awareness often merely as a sort of alertness.
2In Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 20, fn. 1, Dennett capitalizes "inten­
tional" and its derivatives to distinguish between the tech­
nical concept of intentionality and the ordinary (uncapital­
ized) concept. The technical concept is the concept as 
Brentano used it; the ordinary concept is the one we use when 
we say, for example, "She missed the appointment intentionally." 
In his later book Brainstorms (Montgomery, Vermont: Bradford
Books, Publishers, 1978), p. 3, Dennett discards the
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capitalization of the technical concept, but warns the reader 
that, whenever he uses "intentionality" or any of its deriv­
atives, he is using the technical term. My use here is also 
technical.
^Dennett, Content and Consciousness, pp. 115-116.
^Dennett, Content and Consciousness, pp. 115-121.
will argue for the connection between speech and 
introspection in the next section.
®Just calling C3P0 an "android" rather than a "robot" 
suggests a willingness to recategorize him.
^Charles Landesman, Jr., "Consciousness," Vol. 2 of 
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards (8 vols.; 
New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press,
1967), pp. 191-192.
Q Oddly enough, perception is often offered as the 
quintessential "outer" conscious mental state— and intro­
spection, of course, is offered as the quintessential "in­
ner" conscious mental state. This brings to mind one of the 
reasons that introspection is a confusing concept; some 
philosophers treat introspection as the quintessential con­
scious mental state; others discuss introspection as an ac­
companiment to or part of the nature of all conscious mental 
states. And often it is not clear which concept is involved 
or even whether the two have been distinguished.
gActually, we ordinarily don't use the terms. No 
one says that he's introspecting, and we run across "per­
ceive" only in mystery stories where it is flavored with the 
sense of "discover" or "realize": "He perceived that things
had gone awry for the would-be murderer"; "She perceived his 
bloodied hand, held furtively behind his back." But philos­
ophers use the terms, and use them in conjunction with 
ordinary language.
^^Arthur E. Falk, "Learning To Report One's Intro­
spections," Philosophy of Science (September 1975), pp. 227- 
229.
^^The genuses are different. "Perception" refers to 
that group of mental states which are sensed, to "external" 
as opposed to "inner" or "internal" mental states; "intro­
spection" refers to those states— internal or external—  
that are conscious.
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12 In fact, people who habitually think about what 
they are going to say next are precisely those people who 
have not learned the art of conversing, an art which re­
quires responding to what someone else is saying, not pro­
claiming one's views when the other person pauses.
^^Another example: Your date, as is his wont, is
late, arid you will surely miss the beginning of the movie.
As you seethe, you mentally rehearse scathing indictments to 
deliver to him upon his arrival. In such situations, the 
lines when finally spoken have an artificial quality that our 
usual speech lacks. Lines that should be spontaneous— like a 
witty comeback or an angry denunciation— fall flat if you 
store them. Such examples reinforce my claim that ordinarily 
talking is not simply the after-the-fact reporting of inner 
thoughts.
^^See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investiga­
tions , trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (3rd ed.; New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1971), #78. Here Wittgenstein compares 
knowing and saying: if,you know how high Mont Blanc is,
then you ought to be able to say how high Mont Blanc is; but 
if you know how a clarinet sounds, then it is not absurd that 
you not be able to say it. Given that knowing in many cases 
takes the form of conscious thought, such examples would seem 
to count against my claim— which I do not yet argue for— that 
states that cannot be put into words are unconscious. But 
such examples perhaps are limited to cases of smelling, 
touching, and hearing: you may know consciously how roses
smell, or how the surface of an egg feels, and yet not be 
able to say it. Still, if you are thinking how the egg 
feels, then surely it would be strange if you could not give 
us even a bit of a description; here, thinking x is different 
from merely knowing x. My point is that thinking requires 
words, and knowing does not.
^^Actually, our ordinary conversations contain unfin­
ished sentences, digressions— but if you habitually do not 
complete your sentences, or digress, we call you on it. We 
expect our spoken conversation to approximate written speech: 
we can tolerate only so much in the way of uncompleted sen­
tences, Lily Tomlin notwithstanding.
^^This example is suggested by Wittgenstein's discus­
sion of expecting in the "Blue Book," The Blue and Brown 
Books (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. 20.
^^I use the term "introspective report" more or less 
interchangeably with these terms: "introspective talk,"
"introspective avowal," and "introspective affirmation." I 
am not concerned here with the controversy over which term
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more correctly describes the phenomenon. I realize that the 
term "introspective report" sounds more formal than the ac­
tivity it involves, and even that in some cases what we are 
doing when we give an introspective "report" is not reporting 
as such. I ask that the awkwardness be overlooked by assuming 
the term to be technical rather than precisely descriptive.
IPRecall Dennett's distinction between awareness^, 
which involves introspective reporting (hence language), and 
awarenessg, which involves behavior control (and no language).
will discuss these two types of case later in this
section.
y nThe possibility is not that you might be wrong all 
of the time; this would be absurd. The possibility is that 
you may be wrong some of the time.
y 1We might conclude that Herbie is different from most 
of us, that just as it seems that some people are incapable 
of love or of joy, it seems that Herbie is incapable of fear. 
(But I think this conclusion would be our last resort, for we 
want more of an explanation than this is.)
22My ambiguous use of "identify" is intentional here. 
The report is a means of identifying one's state both in the 
sense of finding out what that state is and also in the sense 
of telling others what it is.
23Where we stand in that range depends on all sorts of 
things that have to do with us as well as with you. We may 
or we may not be psychologically discerning, we may or we may 
not be habitually suspicious, we may or we may not like you 
or be jealous of you.
^^The reason we give in the cases where the behavior 
and account are consistent with each other but inappropriate 
for the situation can touch on one or more of a number of 
difficulties. We cannot, as in the cases where the account 
belies the appropriate behavior, point to your behavior as 
evidence that your account is wrong. Our reasons must be 
telling in a different way: "You always act bored when
you're scared." Or: "People just don't act that way when
they've been held up." Or: "You were in a state of shock,
you were out of it."
25"Nervous," "upset," and "afraid" of course are not 
synonymous, but in many situations we use them interchange­
ably. That we do so makes the settling of introspective ac­
counts easier (in practice) and harder (in theory). I be­
lieve that whereas the first three statements might each be
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more or less true of Herbie's reaction, the fourth clearly 
rings wrong: "You are nervous"; "You are upset"; "You are
afraid"; "You are exhilarated."
We use this phrase misleadingly. In a dangerous 
situation we all (usually) are pumped with adrenalin, but 
when we mention this common fact with respect to someone, 
we mean to distinguish his response from ours. We mean to 
say that he "works" the adrenalin to his advantage while the 
rest of us are victimized by it.
27In both senses: finding out what the state is and
telling us what it is.
2 8But this is unusual, and perhaps occurs more often 
in sexual situations than other situations, because of the 
tendency we have to deceive ourselves about our sexual de­
sires and intentions. Sometimes we are aware only of wanting 
to be friendly, or of wanting to "get comfortable," or of 
being "too drunk to drive home."
29Here is a different and wise suggestion from T. H. 
White in The Once and Future King (New York: Berkley
Medallion Books, 1958), p. 388: "It is a pity that language
is such a clumsy weapon that we cannot say that a mother was 
'unconscious' of her baby crying in the next room— with the 
meaning that the mother somehow, unconsciously, knew that it 
was crying." White's point has to do not with the question 
whether to allow "unconscious of" but with the question 
whether to allow "unconscious of" to mean "unconsciously 
aware of."
^^The past perfect tense would be better here, for I 
am supposing that Ralph did things over a period of time 
that, cumulatively, ruined Ann's (potential or probable) 
career as, say, a banker. But the past perfect tense is, 
for my purposes, clumsier than the simple past tense.
^^See J. L, Austin on "trouser" words, in "A Plea for 
Excuses," in Philosophical Papers, ed. by J. O. Urmson and 
G. J. Warnock (2nd ed.: London: Oxford University Press,
1970), p. 192.
32In many instances, there is no straightforward op­
position between "consciously" and "unconsciously." "Con­
sciously" has less good use than "unconsciously" (although 
it can make good and legitimate sense on occasion— as in the 
Ralph case). Perhaps it is the case that only certain types 
of verbs can be modified by "consciously." "Consciously" 
works better with verbs that denote intentions and motives 
than with verbs that denote physical movements and actions. 
"He unconsciously boarded the bus." (He was thinking of
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something else.) But; "He consciously boarded the bus."
(He knew it was the wrong bus? He was paying special at­
tention to the high first step? He knew he had no money for 
fare?) In many instances, the use of "consciously" takes us 
out of the realm of "aware/not aware"; the use of "uncon­
sciously" does not.
33Starting here, and continuing through this chapter,
I will use "intentionally" and "unintentionally" and "intend" 
in their non-technical uses; see Chapter Two, Section One, 
p. 90, fn. 2.
CHAPTER III
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTINCTION THAT 
THE ANALYSIS HAS REVEALED
Introduction
Freud, investigating neurotic and pathological sexu­
ality, discovered a great deal about how "normal" sexuality 
functions, I have taken the opposite approach. In Chapter 
Two, I discussed "normal," everyday examples of conscious and 
unconscious mental states, the ordinary, well-functioning 
cases where, for example, we say with authority, "He is un­
aware of his real motivation." I used such examples to il­
lustrate how ordinarily we distinguish between conscious and 
unconscious states and, in the areas in which our ordinary 
assessments are fuzzy, I wished to recommend how we ought to 
distinguish between conscious and unconscious states. That 
is, I wished to provide a theory that takes into account 
both the case in which our ordinary way of distinguishing 
conscious from unconscious states is successful and the case 
in which our ordinary way of distinguishing gives us wrong
or odd answers. I wanted a theory that does justice to the
96
97
misleading, as well as the clear, cases. I claimed that the 
theory that can accomplish these things uses what a person 
says— the introspective avowal— as evidence that a state is 
conscious, or unconscious: I said that if a person can avow
his mental state, then that state is conscious; if he cannot, 
then the state is unconscious.
Now I want to take this theory, which is grounded in 
the ordinary— if sometimes misleading— cases, and apply it 
to the extraordinary, the bizarre, and the dysfunctioning 
cases, the cases that our ordinary theory of mind cannot ex­
plain. My theory of mind will be vindicated to the extent 
that its application to such cases helps us to understand 
and explain these cases. In turn, such cases, interpreted 
my way, will support my claim that consciousness depends upon 
a certain level of linguistic skill, and does not cause it.
In Chapter Two, I showed that our ordinary notions 
about the nature of mind are derived in part from a Cartesian 
view of mind. I claimed that at least some of the results of 
such a view are (1) the belief that rational thought is the 
paradigm mental state, (2) the belief that consciousness is 
coextensive with mind, and (3) the belief that introspection 
is an "inner" sensing in the same way that perception is an 
"outer" sensing. I claimed that we cannot explain the rela­
tionship of certain typical mental events to the behavior 
that typically accompanies them because our view of mind en­
tails this: that one engages continually in an introspective
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observing of the contents of one's mind, and thus that one 
is not only the best, but an infallible, judge of what one 
is about. And this is often just not the case. Recall 
Herbie; he claimed that he was not afraid during the hold­
up, but we didn't believe him. We saw him on film and we 
knew he was afraid. And yet, ordinarily, we would want to 
say that Herbie has more authority than we on what he feels 
at any particular time. Another way that our Cartesian in­
heritance misleads us concerns our concept of awareness. 
Usually we associate awareness with introspection, but also 
we associate awareness with behavior control, as when we 
say, "The bee must have been aware of the tree; he swerved 
to miss it." Not distinguishing between the two senses of 
awareness— introspection and behavior control— reinforces 
our inability to account for ordinary phenomena such as 
one's successfully driving home without once thinking about 
the act of driving home. Whenever we say, "You must have 
been afraid" or "You must have been aware of the correct 
exit," that is when our ordinary view of mind has failed us, 
because our ordinary— and Cartesian— view of mind does not 
properly emphasize the role of behavior in our mental life.
I have claimed that a theory of mind that allows the 
unconscious and behavior their fair share of the limelight, 
and thus that accounts for much of the typical human activ­
ity that a Cartesian view ignores or misconceives, is a the­
ory that bases consciousness on speech. I have claimed that
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such a theory recognizes the two features of awareness, and 
recognizes that one of those features— introspection— is 
linguistic and is the necessary condition for consciousness; 
such a theory divorces mind from consciousness, and con­
sciousness from thought, and marries consciousness to speech. 
But such a theory also accounts for much typical behavior and 
mental life— which our ordinary Cartesian view, with its em­
phasis on consciousness, cannot account for.
In Chapter Three, I apply my theory of mind to a typ­
ical behavior and mental phenomena. I discuss the case of 
split-brain patients who in certain experimental situations 
cannot avow their mental state m(x) but who act as if they
have mental state m(x). I argue that my theory of mind,
which links consciousness to speech, can make sense of such 
patients' behavior— and that a Cartesian theory cannot. Also 
I discuss the apparent introspective avowals of language- 
using apes, which constitute behavior that in humans we would 
view as evidence of consciousness. I argue that if after
learning a language these apes can do the things we can do
when we have a conscious mental state— i.e., verbally ex­
press awareness of that state— then that further supports 
the view that language precedes consciousness, that con­
sciousness is based upon a certain level of linguistic skill.
Split-Brain Patients
Experiments have been performed on human beings in
whom the two halves of the cerebral cortex were severed at
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the corpus callosum. The results of these experiments are 
consistent with my distinction between conscious and uncon­
scious mental states on the basis of our ability or inabil­
ity to avow those states. Also, my thesis is advantageous 
here in that a theory that does not interpret the role 
speech plays in conscious activity the -way I do must explain 
the results of these experiments in most implausible ways. 
Thomas Nagel, in his article "Brain Bisection and the Unity 
of Consciousness," describes the experiments and presents 
five implausible interpretations of their results.^ For im­
plausible reasons, Nagel rejects all five interpretations, 
and then presents his own implausible conclusions. Neither 
the interpretations that he examines nor his own conclusions 
recognize the significance of speech in our mental life; 
rather, Nagel's discussion focuses on the question, "How 
many whole minds does an individual have?" as the basis for 
the five interpretations he rejects and the one that he 
gives.
The experiments are set up so that only one hemi­
sphere at a time is stimulated. Since the hemispheres are 
disconnected, neither hemisphere "knows" the information 
given exclusively to the other. Since the right hemisphere 
does not have a developed speech center, information fed to 
that hemisphere cannot be reported by the patient. For ex­
ample, if the word "hat" is flashed in front of the visual 
field controlled by the right hemisphere, the patient will
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insist that he saw nothing— for the visual field controlled 
by his left hemisphere, which produces speech, "saw" nothing. 
The patient's left hand, however, will pick up the hat. If 
an object is put in the patient's left hand (which is con­
trolled by the right hemisphere) and he is told to guess what 
it is, wrong guesses cause him to frown or grimace, and cor­
rect guesses cause him to smile; these reactions come from 
the "listening” right hemisphere, which "knows" what the ob­
ject is. Yet outside the experimental situation, these peo­
ple perform normally. They seem to be able to do so because 
the hemispheres co-operate by giving each other all sorts of 
sensorily perceptible cues to compensate for the frustration 
of their normal means of communication through the corpus 
callosum.^
Nagel suggests five possible ways to interpret these 
data; each of these ways is an attempt to make the data con­
form to our "concept of the individual mind." The first two 
interpretations are based on the question whether the activ­
ities of the right hemisphere can be said to be mental. The 
first interpretation identifies the responses of the right 
hemisphere with the processes of an automaton, processes, 
that is, which are not conscious mental processes. Nagel 
argues against this hypothesis by trying to show that the 
activities of the right hemisphere are not automatic and are 
in fact conscious, even though the subject always denies 
awareness of these activities. I too believe that the
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hypothesis is wrong, but not for the reasons Nagel offers.
It seems clear to me that most of the responses emanating 
from the non-verbal right hemisphere are (like) the sorts 
of responses we call unconscious, and that these activities, 
with the clearly conscious activities of the verbal left 
hemisphere, together constitute our concept of what a nor­
mal "individual mind" is.*
Nagel claims that speech is not "a necessary condi­
tion of consciousness,"^ for while the information given ex­
clusively to the right hemisphere cannot be reported, the 
other parts of the body controlled by the right hemisphere 
can respond appropriately to the information. But I do not 
think that we would want to say that such behavior is non­
verbal reporting. Reports are verbal. If the only way that 
the patient can respond to the stimulus is, say, by picking 
up the hat, if he cannot tell us what word he saw, and fur­
ther, if he insists that he saw nothing, then we must infer 
that he was not aware^ of the stimulus. This is analogous 
to the case of the normal person who cannot report and per­
haps even denies a mental state m(x), even though his behav­
ior indicates the mental state that he denies; in such a 
case, we say that the mental state is unconscious.
Nagel claims that
. . . what the right hemisphere can do on its own is too 
elaborate, too intentionally directed, and too psycho­
logically intelligible to be regarded merely as a col­
lection of unconscious automatic processes.”
In other words, for Nagel, responses that are (to the degree
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that the right hemisphere's responses are) elaborate, inten­
tional, and psychologically intelligible cannot be uncon­
sciously directed, for unconscious states are merely "auto­
matic processes." The activities of the right hemisphere 
must be conscious— at least those activities that have the 
three characteristics that Nagel believes mark conscious 
states. But it is not the case that the presence of those 
three characteristics distinguishes conscious from uncon­
scious states, for at least this reason; unconsciously di­
rected behavior is not always automatic, although often it 
is. Much behavior is the result of elaborate, intentional, 
psychologically intelligible unconscious mental.states.
Think of the person whose unconscious resentment of her boss 
manifests itself in the propagation of all sorts of office 
disasters calculated to embarrass and frustrate her boss; 
she feels distress at or denies her continuing role in what 
she would clearly recognize as a plot or plan if her resent­
ment were conscious. What distinguishes conscious from un­
conscious resentment, as in this case, is not the elaborate­
ness, or intention, or psychological intelligibility of the 
activity, but rather the person's awareness^ of the resent­
ment. (In fact, action that is automatic is so because of 
our u n a w a r e n e s s o f  such action: the automaticness of an
action is due to our not introspecting it. Furthermore, much 
of what we consider automatic, or instinctive, or "trained"—  
say, the responses of falcons or hunting dogs— is intricate.
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and purposeful, and in many respects unrepetitive.)
Nagel thinks that the activities of the right hemi­
sphere are not unconscious for the reason that they can be 
elaborate, and so forth. But their being elaborate and so 
forth does not count against their being unconscious. How­
ever, Nagel has another reason for concluding that we may 
refuse to call the responses of the right hemisphere uncon­
scious. He says that
. . . the right hemisphere displays enough awareness of 
what it is doing to justify the attribution of conscious 
control in the absence of verbal testimony. If the pa­
tients did not deny any awareness of those activities, 
no doubts about their consciousness would arise at all.7
But the inability of the patient to give verbal testimony is 
precisely what causes us to doubt that the activity is con­
sciously directed. The ability of the patient to respond 
appropriately to the stimulus to his right hemisphere shows 
the kind of "awareness of what [he] is doing" that we call 
awarenessg— that is, the awareness that controls behavior. 
This type of control is not sufficient for us to regard as 
conscious the activity which results. When the subject 
denies awareness of x, when awareness^ is absent, then how­
ever elaborate, intentional, and psychologically intelligible 
his behavior is, that behavior cannot be said to be con­
sciously directed. A conscious mental state is characterized 
by my ability to make an immediate, relatively error-free, 
introspective report of it. An unconscious mental state is 
one which I may infer from later reflection on my behavior
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or from others' reports or accusations. A conscious mental 
state is one of which the subject is aware^; and for a human 
being to be aware^ of something is for him to be able in 
principle to report that awareness. For a human being, 
awareness and speech are closely connected. The primary 
basis for deciding whether or not to call a response con­
scious is the subject's ability to talk about it. The ac­
tivities that are close to consciousness are so insofar as 
they are verbalizable.
Nagel says that the "right hemisphere is not very 
intelligent and it cannot talk. . ."® The first (intelli­
gence) has very little to do with the question whether or 
not the activities of the right hemisphere are conscious, 
and the second (ability to talk) everything. Unconscious 
mental activities range in intelligence from quite primitive, 
unintegrated impulses to complex projects of great cunning. 
But Nagel evidently believes that the intelligence shown by 
a response has a bearing on whether an activity is con­
sciously or unconsciously controlled, for he follows his 
statement that the right hemisphere is not very intelligent 
with the disclaimer that the right hemisphere can engage in 
a number of complex and discriminatory activities. Presum­
ably Nagel means to be showing that although the activities 
of the right hemisphere generally are not done with the 
level of intelligence of the left hemisphere, still, the 
right hemisphere can do many things that exhibit the mental
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dexterity that is found in the activities of the left hemi­
sphere, and that we associate with consciously directed, 
intelligent behavior.
But trying to distinguish conscious from unconscious 
behavior by appealing to the intelligence shown by the be­
havior begs the question that Nagel is trying to answer.
Nagel assumes that unconscious behavior is only automatic 
and then tries to show how superior to mere automatic behav­
ior are the highly appropriate responsive activities con­
trolled by the right hemisphere. Even if we grant that the 
right hemisphere shows some intelligence, it does not follow 
that to the extent that the right hemisphere is intelligent 
it is conscious. (Think of the responses of computers.) If 
intelligence has little, and talk everything, to do with con­
sciousness, then Nagel has not made his case.
Nagel asks us to imagine a person deprived of his 
left hemisphere and thus dependent solely on his right;
Nagel says that we would not on that account call this per­
son an "automaton.” He gives this as evidence for his claim 
that the responses of the right hemisphere are conscious.
For, "though speechless, [this person] would remain conscious 
and active, with a diminished visual field and partial paral­
ysis on the right side from which he would eventually re-
gcover to some extent." First, Nagel has again begged the 
question: he says that we would not call this person an
automaton because the person would remain "conscious and
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active.” But he has already told us that "unconscious" is 
equivalent to "automatic." Further, he implies that uncon­
sciously directed behavior cannot be active; this is just 
not so.
But more important, Nagel is confusing "being con­
scious" with "having a conscious mental state." I agree with 
Nagel that we can call the man "conscious"— but this is only 
granting that he is not knocked out or in a coma. If the 
man cannot avow mental state m(x), then that state is not 
conscious; if he can never avow any mental state m(x), then 
on my analysis, we cannot even say that he is a conscious 
being, i.e., one capable of having conscious mental states. 
This man's status is troublesome in that presumably he was 
a normally functioning person before the loss of his left 
hemisphere. Nevertheless, his case is like that of the bee: 
We may want to say, he could talk, he would report that
he saw the word 'hat' on the card." But, as in the case of 
the bee, we have no way of knowing "what is going on in his 
mind" when he performs his tasks— because he cannot tell us. 
His performance, like the bee's, has to do with behavior 
control, with awarenessg.
It may be replied that, since the man could speak 
before, his case is not like the bee's, whose inability to 
talk is part of his make-up. It may be claimed that this 
man's dysfunction is comparable to the dysfunction of a man 
who has been gagged, or who is temporarily mute from
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laryngitis. But the gagged man and the laryngitic man are 
merely prevented from speaking; our imaginary man cannot 
speak. It may be said that the gagged man's eyes "plead 
mutely" for deliverance, that clearly he would be begging 
for mercy if ungagged. I say, first, that there is no real 
substitute for verbalization.^^ Second, the imaginary par­
alyzed man is not trying with all sorts of gestures to let 
us know what he is "thinking." He is not like the man with 
laryngitis but without a pencil and paper, desperately try­
ing to substitute non-verbal for verbal behavior. Think of 
the experimental subjects: they could talk, but they could
not talk about the stimuli to their right hemispheres. It 
makes no sense to say of them, "If they could talk, they 
would say such and such." The paralyzed man is like them: 
like them, only his right hemisphere is stimulated and he 
cannot talk about the stimulus; as with them, it makes no 
sense to say, "If he could talk, he would say such and 
such." It is the absence of a certain kind of communication- 
center that is crucial in the cases of split-brain patients, 
as with the bee.
Nagel sums up this part of his argument by remarking 
that it "seems clear that the right hemisphere's activities 
are not unconscious . . On the contrary, it seems clear
that the right hemisphere's responses are precisely the kinds 
of responses that we would characterize as unconscious. It 
is trivially true that if I am not aware^ of x, then I cannot
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report such awareness. But the converse is true, and not 
trivially. If I cannot report awareness of x, then I am not 
a w a r e o f  x. If my behavior seems strongly to indicate that 
my mental state is m(x), then in spite of the absence of my 
avowal of m(x), we say that I have the state m(x), and that 
it is unconscious.
The second interpretation of the experimental data, 
like the first, denies that the responses of the right hemi­
sphere belong to a mind; this interpretation proposes to view 
the responses as being conscious— but as not belonging to a 
mind! I cannot make sense of a proposal that certain activ­
ities might be conscious but not mental and leave this pro­
posal for your independent assessment. (Nagel argues that
the activities of the right hemisphere have a "mental struc-
12ture," and so, wisely, rejects this interpretation. )
The last three interpretations of the experimental 
data do not, like the first two, question whether the activ­
ities of the right hemisphere are mental. The last three 
interpretations concern this question: Do split-brain pa­
tients have two minds, one mind, or a mind that occasionally 
splits in two? This question is essentially like that to 
which Freud addressed himself, in the early years of this 
century, when he justified his concept of the unconscious.
He claimed that the main feature of unconscious mental pro­
cesses is that we are not aware of them. He argued that un­
conscious mental states must be psychical by showing that
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only the postulation of unconscious, mental phenomena can 
make meaningful our inconsistent or puzzling responses— re­
sponses that we deny or cannot explain. Also, Freud argued 
that it•is absurd to think that we might have a second con­
sciousness (mind) in ourselves that is radically unlike the 
first: how do you justify calling this second mind conscious­
ness when its characteristics are so different from those of 
the first mind? Freud showed that only a mind made up of 
conscious and unconscious states can account for human 
activity
Interpretation Four, which suggests that the hemi­
spheres together constitute a mind, seems on the face of it 
to be Freud's position. But Nagel argues against this posi­
tion. He believes that the dissociation of activities in 
the experiments involving the two hemispheres are evidence 
that these brains consist of two minds. He points out the 
seeming oddness of the patients' functioning with apparent 
normalcy outside the experimental situations: the dissoci­
ated information becomes pooled, i n t e g r a t e d . B u t ,  given 
the Freudian model of the mind, isn't this exactly what we 
should expect? Nagel says that the problem in deciding on 
the number of minds that the split-brain patients have is 
aggravated by our "quaint" belief in the "ordinary simple 
idea of a single person." He seems to hope that "someday, 
when the complexities of the human control system become 
clearer," we will be able to abandon this b e l i e f . B u t
I l l
there is no reason to abandon our highly intuitive and wholly 
workable concept of the individual human being with one mind 
when we have a model of mind that can account for the behav­
ior both of ordinary human beings and of human beings whose 
cortices have been severed, human beings, that is, whose 
brains show specifically some of "the complexities of the 
human control system."
Only by assuming, with Freud, that individual minds 
comprise both conscious and unconscious mental states do we 
make sense of human behavior. Further, only Freud's model 
can account for the results of the experimental cases dis­
cussed. I do not wish to suggest that unconscious mental 
activity has a physical locale, and that that locale is the 
speechless right hemisphere, and that conscious mental activ­
ity has a physical locale, the verbal left hemisphere. I 
wish only to point out that the activities of the severed 
right hemisphere are amazingly like those that we would 
characterize as unconsciously controlled, and that the rea­
son this is so is that the right hemisphere produces behav­
ior that is responsive to situations and instructions, that 
is, purposeful ("meaningful") and appropriate, but that the 
subject is unaware^ of; he cannot claim it as his own, he 
cannot avow it. Nevertheless, I do wish to claim the 
striking analogy between the responses of the right hemi­
sphere and unconscious mental responses as corroboration of 
my model of mind, the Freudian model. And when we distinguish
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between conscious and unconscious mental states on the basis 
of awareness^, we provide support for Freud's model.
If awareness^, which involves speech, is the basis 
for our.distinguishing conscious and unconscious states, 
then what are we to say of language-using apes? Until re­
cently, only human beings have been able to avow their states 
and so only they would have qualified as conscious beings, on 
my model. What consequences for my theory does the existence 
of language-using apes have?
Language-Using Apes
I have claimed that awareness^, which involves the 
ability to make introspective reports, is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for consciousness, that is, for having 
conscious mental states. Until very recently, only human 
beings had the ability to make introspective reports and 
hence only human beings were capable of consciousness. Now 
several chimpanzees and a couple of gorillas seem to have 
been taught how to make introspective r e p o r t s . S h a l l  we 
then say that these apes are conscious beings?
The question that immediately suggests itself con­
cerns the nature of introspective reporting: How do we know
that the ape really is making an introspective report? How 
do we know that the gorilla is "really" scared when she, for 
example, signs "Koko scared"?^^ Or, suppose we grant that 
Koko ^  scared (because she acts scared), and suppose that 
Koko signs "Koko scared": How do we know that Koko's being
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scared and her saying that she is scared are linked in the 
correct way, that is, in the way that a human being's con­
scious mental states and introspective reports are linked?
How do we know that Koko is really making an introspective 
report as opposed to merely reacting with a conditioned re­
sponse to being scared? How do we know that Koko's avowal 
is like our avowal and not like the response of, say, a dog 
trained to bark when he is confronted by a stranger?
For one thing, we know that language-using apes 
spontaneously and correctly use language in contexts other 
than the original learning context and that they take words 
learned in a variety of circumstances and put them together 
in later circumstances. The meaningful application of a 
response learned in one kind of situation to other, novel, 
situations is (at least some) evidence that the response is 
not like the conditioned, rote response of the dog but rather 
is like the creative manipulation of language by human beings. 
This kind of linguistic virtuosity prompts not the question 
whether a statement is a real introspective report, but only 
the sorts of doubts we have about human beings' introspective 
reports. We do not wonder whether or not a human being's 
avowal is correctly linked to his state. We may question 
the sincerity or perspicacity of a person's avowal, but this 
sort of doubt is not the same thing as doubting that Koko's 
seemingly meaningful avowals are linked in the right way to 
her states. If I say to you, "I'm scared," then, if my face
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is white and I cling to you, or if I start screaming, you 
accept my introspective report. But if I say "I'm scared" 
but otherwise act as if I am enjoying myself hugely or re­
fuse to leave the movie theatre, then you doubt that I am 
really scared. You do not accept (anyway, unqualifiedly) 
my introspective report. Similarly, if Koko signs "Koko 
scared," and acts as if she is scared— say, she cowers, or 
runs to you and holds onto you— then, since her behavior and 
avowal are just what we should expect of someone who is 
scared and can talk, we have no practical reason to doubt 
her introspective report. Our philosophical doubts concern 
the question how introspective reports are linked to mental 
states, and it seems to me that such doubts are misapplied 
here. It seems to me that whether the subject making the 
reports is human or simian is irrelevant: anyone consis­
tently doing the things that fulfill the conditions for 
making an introspective report is making introspective re­
ports. The conditions are behavioral and contextual; they 
are observable. If we observe an ape making seemingly mean­
ingful introspective avowals in situations in which the 
avowals are appropriate and are consistent with his behavior, 
then we are observing "introspective reports linked in the 
correct way to mental states."
If you start with the assumption, "An ape isn't a 
person, so how can these supposed introspective reports 
really be introspective reports?", you have started in the
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18wrong place. D. C. Dennett points out that "humanity" and 
"personhood" are terms that we treat as coextensive— because 
so far, human beings are the only persons we recognize. But 
what makes one a human being is different from what makes 
one a person— the first requires a certain biological con­
dition, namely, being born of human parents; the second re­
quires certain normative conditions— about which there is 
little agreement— but not, as traditionally has been held, 
the condition of being human. Earlier, I had in mind a dis­
tinction similar to Dennett's when I suggested that "con­
scious being" and "human being" are not coextensive terms.
I claimed that if one can make introspective reports then 
one can have conscious mental states and can be considered 
a conscious being; the necessary condition in such a case is
speech, not humanity. This claim— reinforced by my argu- 
19ment that the introspective report is not the public air­
ing of a private process, is not an avowal linked by a 
ghostly chain to a mental state, but rather is the criterion 
by which we judge the subject's awareness of his mental 
state— provides for a set of conditions for consciousness 
that a talking ape could fulfill. We ought have no more 
problem accepting Koko's introspective reports than we have 
accepting yours, because what counts in either case is the 
meaningful interaction of avowal, behavior, and situation; 
whether or not Koko is a human being is irrelevant, because 
being human is not a necessary condition for consciousness.
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Even in human beings, consciousness is dependent on 
the introspective report, so that if an ape does all the 
things that constitute what in a human being would be an 
introspective report, then we must say that an ape is having 
a conscious mental state. The person who claims that "real" 
avowals are made only by conscious beings (i.e., human be­
ings) is putting the cart before the horse. Part of the 
problem in understanding the nature of consciousness is that, 
contrary to our mythology, consciousness is nothing more than 
the awarenesswe have of certain states. And this awareness 
is not possible without a certain use of language, the intro­
spective report. We have little inclination to call apes 
conscious (at least, not much more than we have to call dogs 
conscious)— until they have learned language and are making 
introspective reports. When Morris the cat meows naggingly 
at 6 p.m. and then, given his dinner, gobbles up his food, 
we know that he was hungry; but we do not want to call his 
hunger conscious. When Koko emphatically punches on the key­
board, "Want apple eat want,"^® we must assume that Koko is 
aware^ of her hunger, because she is avowing it in the way 
that we do when we make "real" introspective reports. If 
you, rather than Koko, were seated at the computer keyboard 
at snack time and were possessed of a simian disregard for 
English grammar, we would accept "Want apple eat want" as a 
meaningful introspective avowal. When the situation is such 
that, if Koko were a human being, we would accept her
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introspective report, then, given the logic of my theory of 
consciousness, we must accept Koko's report as evidence 
that her hunger is conscious in the way that hunger in a 
human being can be conscious. If a person cannot avow his 
state, we call that state unconscious; and if a person avows 
a state in appropriate circumstances, we call the state 
conscious.
One might insist that whatever else consciousness is 
based on, at least it is based on reason, and that only in­
dividuals who reason can be considered conscious beings and 
hence can have conscious mental states: Surely animals who
punch out "Want apple eat want" on a keyboard are not rea­
soning, therefore, whatever it is that they are doing, it 
does not constitute that stuff that conscious mental states 
are made of. But Lana, a chimp participating in Project 
Washoe, who had never seen orange pop but who knew the fruit 
orange and the drink coke, characterized orange pop as "coke 
which is orange"; her inference is a good— if simple— exam­
ple of reasoning.
Lying is an even more telling example of an ape's 
reasoning ability; also, an ape's lying provides evidence 
for consciousness not just on the basis of reasoning but al­
so on the basis of my criterion, awareness^. Koko broke the 
sink in her trailer by sitting on it. Ms. Patterson, Koko's 
teacher, was out; when she returned, she asked Koko if she 
had broken the sink. Koko pointed to Patterson's assistant.
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who had been babysitting when the incident occurred, and
signed "Kate there bad": obviously, Koko hoped to shift the
21blame for the broken sink to Kate. Now, a lie is purpose­
ful— it is used to fulfill an intention, and a lie is verbal. 
Unlike some forms of deceit, a lie requires words. An uncon­
scious mental state can satisfy the first condition, for an 
unconscious mental state can be purposeful. But an uncon­
scious mental state cannot be verbally communicated; an un­
conscious state is a state that I am unaware^ of and that 
therefore I cannot report. So a lie must be consciously 
perpetrated. This is not to say that a lie is the same thing 
as an introspective report. The use of words that constitutes 
lying, i.e., misrepresenting something in order to achieve 
something, is not identical with the use of words that con­
stitutes introspective reporting, i.e., avowing your mental 
state. But when you lie to someone, you must be aware^ that 
you are lying to him. If you cannot avow the lie, you are 
not lying; you may be deceiving yourself as to what you are 
about, but you are not involved in the conscious manipulation 
of facts that lying requires. So if you are a creature who 
lies, you are a creature capable of awareness^, and of 
consciousness.
And it is unreasonable to suppose that Koko was not 
"really" lying, that she was not trying to mislead Patterson. 
For what explanation could there be for Koko's immediate de­
nunciation of Kate's moral character in response to Patterson's
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inquiry other than that Koko intended to place the blame on 
Kate? Here the question, "How do we know that Koko really 
is lying?" seems far-fetched. Here is an example in which 
there can be no doubt of Koko's awareness of what she is 
doing and of her reasoning ability. I suppose that a (very 
weak) case could be made for the view that Koko's statements 
felicitously coincide with the circumstances in which they 
are made: Suppose that Koko is always hungry or at least
never turns food down, so that whenever she signs "Want 
apple eat want" the statement cannot fail to be appropriate. 
But to presume that Koko's lies are felicitous accidents is 
implausible: It is much more reasonable to view Koko's state­
ment as a lie than to argue that her statement only seemed to 
be a lie, for what else could it be? A theory saying other­
wise would have to rest on formulations far more preposter­
ous than the view that a gorilla was trying to get somebody 
else in trouble in order to save herself. In any similar 
case involving a human being, our intuitive and immediate 
assumption would be that an attempt at deception was in­
volved. To say, "But Koko is not a human, not a conscious 
being, so we can't assume as we would ordinarily that she's 
lying," is to beg the question.
Lies involve what Dennett calls "second-order inten­
tions" and are made by "second-order intentional systems."
We attribute to second-order intentional systems such as­
criptions as: S believes that T desires that p, and S hopes
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that T fears that q; that is, we ascribe to such systems 
beliefs, desires, and intentions about beliefs, desires, and 
intentions. Dennett says that we habitually and profitably 
ascribe first-order intentions, beliefs, and desires to 
animals; that is, we view animals as first-order intentional 
systems and explain their behavior on the basis of this view. 
But, he says, we are inclined to ascribe second-order inten­
tions only to human beings. Yet animals do seem capable of 
behavior that involves second-order intentions, for example, 
the bird who feigns a broken wing in order to lure the pred­
ator from the nest. This behavior of course is instinctual 
or tropistic; the bird does not propose the ruse to herself 
or run through an argument or think out a plan in any way. 
Still, often human beings deceive and they do not consciously 
think through the plan to deceive either. What matters is
that the deceiver by his behavior hopes to induce a certain
22belief in the deceived. Dennett discusses this in part 
to show that second-order intentionality does not depend on 
language; if this is the case, then deception— or hoping 
that T will falsely believe that x— is not a peculiarly 
human sort of behavior; and thus it is not impossible or 
even unlikely that an animal with language can use that lan­
guage in order to deceive, in order, that is, to lie. And 
if he ^  using language in order to deceive, he is aware^ 
of his engaging in deception, and he is conscious. The ar­
ticle about Koko does not say that Koko admits her lies; so
121
far as I know, no one has asked her to admit them. But the 
point I am making is not undercut by Koko's not admitting 
or avowing her lies, for the logic of lying is that it is 
not possible to lie unless you are aware^ of your doing so, 
unless you are able in principle to avow doing so. A mis­
representation is not a lie unless it is consciously 
perpetrated.
Both Lana's inference and Koko's lie are impossible 
without language. The view that reason is the mark of the 
conscious being is misguided, because it has us looking for 
the wrong sorts of things when we evaluate the concept of 
consciousness. We tend to limit the application of the con­
cept arbitrarily because we have prejudged the field: "He
must be able to reason because he is a conscious being; he 
is a conscious being because, as a human being, he has the 
faculty of reason." And: "Lana isn't really reasoning, be­
cause she isn't a conscious being." But when we look at 
cases of reasoning, we find that reasoning occurs both con­
sciously and unconsciously, so that reason cannot be a cri­
terion for consciousness. Think of the squirrel who figures 
out how to get round the obstacle you have placed on your 
telephone line to keep her from jumping from the line to the 
roof of your house; she, like the bird, doesn't consciously 
think through a plan, but she does figure out a way to cir­
cumvent the obstacle. "Reasoning" may consist of trial and 
error; reasoning need not involve any conscious thought at
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all. I realize that my notion of reasoning here may sound 
idiosyncratic, but actually the unidiosyncratic principle 
by which we ascribe intentions to animals holds here; It 
is natural to view animals as intentional and therefore ra­
tional systems. It is natural to say of the squirrel: "She
figured out how to get over that obstacle," and, of the bird: 
"She lured the cat away from the nest." We have no alter­
native way of viewing animals; for example, we do not think 
of squirrels and birds and dogs as automatons. We view much 
of animal behavior as on a line with much of human behavior.
We say, "I solved the problem in my sleep last night," as we
23say, "The squirrel figured out how to get past the obstacle." 
The assumption of inferential processes in ourselves and in 
animals is natural and profitable and is questioned only 
when we raise philosophical problems of mind.
The line between consciousness and the Unconscious 
does not involve reason, because reasoning occurs both con­
sciously and unconsciously. The line involves language; the 
line involves the kind of awareness that presupposes lan­
guage. The difference between conscious and unconscious rea­
soning is that you can avow the former but only assume or 
infer or ascribe to yourself the latter the way you would to 
someone else.
In Chapter II, Section Five, I questioned the value 
of the concept "conscious being." Consciousness is a con­
cept that should not be attributed to species, or to the
123
members of a species, but rather should be a characteriza-
24tion of certain individual mental states. The concept of 
consciousness should be limited to instances of introspec­
tive avowal that characterize conscious mental states. And 
language-using apes can have conscious mental states in the 
way that language-using humans can have conscious mental 
states; If you are able to make introspective reports, then 
those mental states that you introspectively report are con­
scious mental states. I have shown that Fido’s wanting to 
go outside and Morris's shoveling his litter onto the kitch­
en floor do not qualify them for consciousness; purposive 
behavior alone does not indicate awareness^ of anything. 
Teaching Fido to roll over or beg does not involve aware- 
ness^. But if you teach an animal to use language, and the 
animal uses language in situations that are appropriate and 
in ways that are consistent with his behavior— then, by my 
rules, the rules we in fact use in everyday life, that animal 
is capable of conscious mental states.
The case of language-using apes supports my belief 
that language precedes consciousness. Apes are quite like 
us, except, some would say, they lack consciousness. But if 
they learn to use language and then behave in ways that— in 
the case of a human--we would say are the results of con­
sciousness, then we are inclined to entertain the view that 
expressing oneself in a language is a condition for conscious­
ness, and further, that the distinction between conscious and 
unconscious is based upon language.
NOTES
Thomas Nagel, "Brain Bisection and the Unity of 
Consciousness," The Philosophy of Mind, ed. by Jonathan 
Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) , 111-125.
See also R. W. Sperry, "Hemisphere Deconnection and Unity 
in Conscious Awareness," American Psychologist, XXIII, No. 
10 (October 1968), 723-733. Nagel refers to this article 
and other articles by Sperry and his collaborators.
2This is generally the case in right-handed adults; 








^^Plainly, a nod of t
ders, or sign-language, or drawing a picture may do quite as 
well as words in signifying awareness, in some situations. 
But this is not the sort of thing I am ruling out by my con­
ditions for awareness^. I am ruling out behavior that indi­
cates that the subject is (somehow) aware of an object but 










^^Dr. Duane Rumbaugh teaches language to apes by means 
of a computer keyboard with lexicographical symbols. Among 
the apes he has worked with is Lana, who, along with the 
chimp Washoe at the University of Oklahoma, is a pioneer in 
her field. Dr. Rumbaugh sums up the language-learning skills 
of chimpanzees in these four points:
(1) Apes learn words relatively easily.
(2) Apes readily start stringing words together to 
form sentences.
(3) Apes readily extend their language skills to 
situations beyond their original context; their 
use of language is not rote learning.
(4) Apes coin labels; Lana, when first confronted 
with orange soda pop, asked for the "coke which 
is orange."
(There is considerable controversy about these claims, es­
pecially (2).) (Emily Hahn, "Animal-Communication, Part II," 
The New Yorker, April 24, 1978, p. 78.)
^^Koko the gorilla "speaks" in American Sign Language 
(Ameslan), which our deaf use, and also by typing on a com­
puter keyboard. See Francine Patterson, "Conversations With 
a Gorilla," National Geographic, Vol. 154, No. 4, October 
1978, pp. 438-465. Koko's skills are modelled on those of 
the chimps involved in Project Washoe and in the program at 
the Yerkes Center (which Dr. Rumbaugh directs): The chimps
at Project Washoe use Ameslan; the chimps at the Yerkes Re­
gional Primate Research Center communicate by typing state­
ments on a computer keyboard. (Incidentally, the keyboard 
method has been so successful at teaching language to apes 
that Dr. Rumbaugh, who designed the computer system, has now 
designed a similar program for teaching language to severely 
retarded children. Dorothy Parkel, who put the program into 
effect, says that the hope is that teaching language to these 
children will help them extend their cognitive as well as 
communicative skills (and thus to live more successfully in 
a world of speaking, thinking human beings). Maxine A. Rock, 
"Keyboard Symbols Enable Retarded Children to 'Speak'," 
Smithsonian, April, 1979, p. 94.
18Dennett, Brainstorms, p. 267.




22Dennett, Brainstorms, pp. 273-277.
23This is not to say that animals reason unconsciously; 
the conscious-unconscious dichotomy applies only to beings 
who are capable of both conscious and unconscious mental 
states.
24But of course those who have one conscious mental 
state will have many.
CHAPTER IV
TYPICALLY CONSCIOUS AND TYPICALLY 
UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES
1My thesis is that conscious states are those states 
that arô characterized by a certain kind of behavioral 
follow-up, the introspective report,.which functions as both 
a condition and a guarantee of the subject's awareness of 
that state, and that unconscious states are those states 
that are not so characterized. Since this is so, perhaps it 
is the case that certain states or kinds of states typically 
are conscious and others typically unconscious: we should
expect, if my thesis holds, that typically conscious states 
should be those that ordinarily we would be aware of in such 
a way as to affirm them easily; that is, we should expect 
that typically conscious states— if they exist— would be 
easier for us to report than typically unconscious states.
Two kinds of states come immediately to mind as typ­
ically conscious: perceiving and having a sensation. Both
are usually easy to report: "Yes, I see it now— it's grey
and huge and hideously ugly." And: "I feel tingly all
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over." Why is it so easy to report perceptions and sensa­
tions? One reason surely is that usually you cannot fail 
to be aware^ of them; the tree just ahead of you, the pain 
in your leg, under normal conditions are nearly impossible 
to miss or to ignore. We are vaguely aware of vague percept 
tions, and we can build the vagueness into our report: "The
fog is so thick that I can't tell if that's a body or just a 
tree trunk." The vagueness is part of the perception in 
such a case; we have many vague perceptions, when our wits 
are sharp but the thing being perceived is not sharp: we
are clearly aware of x— but x is obscured by fog in the case 
of visual perception or x is obscured by the murmuring of 
people in the seats around you in the case of auditory per­
ception. In such a case, you may have to strain to give 
your introspective report; the fault lies not with your not 
attending to x, but with x's being hard to see or hear.
Nevertheless, there ^  a sort of vagueness about 
some states that keeps them on the fringes of unconscious­
ness: You hear the clatter of garbage can lids in the alley
and you realize that you have been listening for some time 
to the whine of the garbage truck from further up the block; 
only when the noise got louder did it isolate itself from 
the background and did the dimly felt undercurrent of sounds 
become alive in consciousness. Or perhaps, suddenly, "out 
of nowhere," you think, "Oh no— I forgot to take out the 
trash"— and, with that thought, you realize that you've been
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listening to the garbage trucks and clatter, and that those 
sounds, heard nearly unconsciously, prompted the thought,
"Oh no— I forgot to take out the trash"; the thought caused 
you to become aware retrospectively of the sounds. This 
last case indicates that in some cases, once we engage our­
selves verbally with a state, we bring definition to the ob­
scurity or fuzziness of a vaguely felt perception. When we 
can classify a perception that has been hovering on the rim
of consciousness, we clear up (at least to an extent) what-
2ever indistinctness may have been present. And here the 
vagueness lies in your not (or not quite) attending to the 
object (although it's not just a matter of attention: if
the whine and clatter were much louder or closer, you would 
have been less inattentive).
But think of the fragrance of a perfume that you can 
smell in the mind's nose, but that you cannot even begin to 
describe— say, you simply don't have the words for fragrances. 
Surely such a case counts against my claim that sensations 
and perceptions— even vague ones— are easy to classify or at 
least to describe and that that is why they typically are 
conscious. Surely, a distinctly perceived smell that cannot 
be described or classified counters my view that what makes 
a state conscious is its availability for introspective 
report.
But I think that a more careful look at the cases of 
vague perceptions will corroborate my claims, not counter
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them, A person's lack or loss or ignorance of the right 
words to describe a distinctly perceived thing ought not 
count against the view that a conscious mental state is one 
that we are set to introspectively report. You say, "It
smells like— it smells like— helplessly, you look at me,
"I'm drawing a blank, I just can't tell you what it smells 
like." As an aficionado of fragrances, I suggest various 
fragrances to you, which you reject or perhaps accept quali- 
fiedly. Perhaps you say, "Yes, that's it exactly!" Or per­
haps we get nowhere, because you haven't the faintest notion 
of what smells like what. When impenetrable ignorance or a 
lack of astuteness or discernment causes you to draw a blank, 
rather than a word, for a smell, then do we have to say that 
the relationship between consciousness and introspective re­
port— which I claim is necessary— simply fails to hold in 
this instance? We want to take your word that you do have 
the distinct smell "in your head" but just can't describe 
it.
But here we touch upon the crux of the problem. I
have claimed that a conscious state is one that I am set to
introspectively avow or report; is this the same as claiming 
that a conscious state is one whose object I can describe 
clearly or distinctly? I think not. Recall the case of the 
shape in the fog: there, we definitely and yet indistinctly
saw an object; we clearly were aware that we saw something, 
but what we saw was not clearly one thing or another; we
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strained to discern what the object was. And recall the 
case of the strangely colored house: we perceived very
clearly the color, but had to strain to describe that color 
because we have no name for that color or because it is a 
rarely seen color. In both cases, our awareness^ of the ob­
ject is not in question: in the first case, we are pre­
vented by the fog from seeing well; in the second, we are 
limited by our unfamiliarity with, and ignorance of the 
names for, rare shades of grey. In both cases we intently 
are attending to the objects and will avow that we are, but 
for one reason or another cannot properly describe the 
objects.
Sometimes the descriptive words fail us, but if we 
avow that we see something but we don't know what it is, or 
if we avow that we have a distinct memory of a smell but we 
don't know how to describe it, we have fulfilled the require­
ment for having a conscious state, namely, that we be aware^ 
of X, that is, that we be set to avow that state. How well 
we describe our states, or the objects of our states, is 
another matter. In the case of the object obscured by fog, 
whether or not we are able to identify the object is entirely 
irrelevant to the question of whether or not our perception 
is conscious. But of course, there are cases in which our 
ability to identify, classify, or describe a perception or 
sensation determines whether or not we can say the state is 
fully conscious. For example, suppose that A says to you:
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"You look strange— do you feel all right?" You, to your 
surprise and relief, say, "You know, I guess I am feeling 
peculiar." You might then think or say that you have been 
feeling a very vague sense of physical disquiet, a sensa­
tion like the onset of a flu, but simply were not aware 
enough of the sensation to classify it or locate it. You 
say, "So that's what's been wrong
In those cases where the identification of the state 
is crucial to our being aware of the state, not identifying 
or describing the state will keep the state unconscious, or 
at least not fully conscious. And this corroborates my 
claim that conscious states are those that we are set to re­
port introspectively. And the kind of case in which the ob­
ject of perception is somehow obscured is also consistent 
with my claim, for the subject is aware^ of the object, and 
can avow that he is; he just cannot tell you definitely what 
the object is. Finally, the lone case of the indescribable 
perfume does not count against my claim: for one thing,
such a case really is quite rare, and for another— and this 
is why such cases are rare, and also is why perceptions and 
sensations typically are conscious— generally, perceptions
4and sensations are easy to classify. The words for sensa­
tions and perceptions come easily to mind. A toothache, the 
sight of the color red or of the mimosa tree, the hearing of 
a scream, are easily translated into report. A rose is a 
rose is a rose, and even if the house is a particularly
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peculiar shade of grey, we have the words at hand to attempt 
to describe that shade; "It's not pale and it's not deep—  
it's kind of a pewter shade but there's some brown in it."
We can ask you if the smell in your mind smells like x, y , 
or z, and if you still can't answer, we can have you smell 
perfume samples until you discover the right, or a similar, 
smell. The problem in this case has to do not with aware­
ness, but only with ignorance of names.
Emotions seem to be, like perceptions and sensations, 
typically conscious, because they seem to be as immediately 
insistent. It seems unlikely that you could hate someone, 
or be consumed with anger, or be guilty, and not be as aware 
of it as you would be of a toothache. When quite young, we 
learn the labels: hate, anger, love, fear, guilt, sorrow; 
when quite young, we feel anger, love, fear, guilt, and so 
forth. We should expect that emotions typically are 
conscious.
But they are not, at least not in the way that they 
seem to be. Why not? We very often misinterpret emotions. 
Think back to Herbie, who claimed that he was not afraid 
during the hold-up, and to Arnold, who claimed that he was 
not afraid during his near-drowning. Such cases are exam­
ples of situations in which the emotions are unconscious.
One might say, "All right, Herbie and Arnold 'really' were 
afraid, but what they felt counts: Herbie felt exhilaration
and Arnold felt apathy. You can't say that they didn't feel
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the emotions they say they felt. You can't say that the 
exhilaration and the apathy weren't conscious. That's what 
they were aware^ of and that's what they introspectively re­
ported." One says, further, "Those cases are like the cases 
used to show that perceptions typically are conscious. The 
woman who couldn't see well in the fog could have said, 'I 
see a body ahead' and then later found out that the object 
was a tree trunk. Still, you would say that her misidenti- 
fication of the object does not erase the fact that her per­
ception was conscious. Similarly, Herbie's misidentification 
of his emotion does not count against his being aware of 
feeling exhilaration."
But the two types of cases are not analogous. Mis- 
identifying your emotion is not the same kind of mistake as 
misidentifying the object of your, perception. The latter 
mistake is generated by fog or poor eyesight (and in any 
case doesn't count against your having perceived an inert 
cylindrical object x); the former mistake is not generated 
by conditions of visibility or, presumably, by any other 
physical fact. While emotions may be directed towards other 
people or towards things, emotions do not have objects in 
the way that perceptions do. If you think that you love 
Nancy, and then, in your psychotherapy sessions, find out 
that really you love Susan, not Nancy, your "mistake" is of 
a different order altogether than if you thought you saw a 
body but then later found that what you really saw was a 
tree trunk.
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Why do people mistake their emotions? What is it 
about emotions that causes people to mistake hate for love, 
or sorrow for hate, which is different from what causes peo­
ple to make the usually innocuous mistakes they make in per­
ceiving? I believe that the answer is that emotions are 
charged with value judgments. Some emotions, say, hate or 
lust or anger, in some cultures and in some situations are 
discouraged so that if you have such a state you will be in­
clined to deceive yourself about it. In our culture, women 
are not encouraged— in the way that men subtly and not so 
subtly are encouraged— to feel indiscriminant lust and so 
are inclined, in periods of unfocused arousal, to disguise 
the state, to misinterpret it^; men like Arnold might dis­
guise their fear as apathy. Emotions are felt, and thus 
seem always to be conscious; but when they are disguised, 
i.e., misperceived and misreported, they are unconscious.^ 
Emotions are not typically conscious, as sensations 
and perceptions are, because often we are inclined to mis­
interpret and thus misreport our emotions so that they will 
do us credit. Emotions are not typically unconscious, ei­
ther, because, as with sensations and perceptions, we usu­
ally cannot fail to be aware of them and also often have no 
reason to disguise them. Love for your baby is not only 
acceptable but is considered admirable, and so you give that 
love free rein; on the other hand, resentment against your 
baby is unacceptable, not only to other people but to you.
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so you refuse to hire babysitters not only during the day 
but also at night so that you ruin your and your husband's 
social life— and harm your relationship; in this way you can 
pay yourself back for your unconscious resentment of your 
baby, which you interpret as "loving my baby too much to 
leave him."
What about other mental states? Beliefs, intentions, 
motives, and desires function differently both from percep­
tions and sensations, and from emotions. These states typ­
ically are unconscious,^ both for the same reason that many 
emotions are unconscious— that is, they generate self- 
deception— and for another reason, that they operate more 
often than not invisibly. You do not feel a motive or be­
lief the way you feel a sensation, an emotion, and— though 
this sounds odd— a perception. Sensations, perceptions, and 
emotions have this in common: they are difficult to ignore,
but beliefs, motives, intentions, and desires are easy to 
ignore, to miss, to be unaware of.
pOften, without any awareness of his belief that p,
A acts as if he believes that p. Whether or not A says,
"Oh yes, I believe that p ," when asked, depends at least in 
part on the answers to these questions; Has A ever thought 
about p, and if not, is p the kind of belief that A readily 
would assent to or reject, or the kind of belief that he 
would want to consider, think through, before assenting to 
or rejecting? Is p a belief that A is likely to deceive
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himself about, that is, the kind of belief that is incom­
patible with the beliefs, motives, intentions, and desires 
that he readily professes, or is it a belief that is com­
patible with those beliefs, desires, motives, and inten­
tions that he professes.
Suppose that A (apparently sincerely) denies that he 
believes that p. Nevertheless, we may still assume that A 
believes that p, because we know that he believes that x, y , 
and z, and they are incompatible with not-p, or even, taken 
together, entail that p. Or we may infer that A believes 
that p, because A behaves as one who believes that p behaves. 
Or we may believe that A believes that p simply because he 
doth (apparently sincerely) protest too much. If we do not 
accept A's claims, we assume that A's belief that p is un­
conscious. If A "searches himself" and still denies that 
he believes that p, but all our other evidence— A's behav­
ior, his other beliefs, his professed desires, his back­
ground— supports the conclusion that he does believe that 
p, then we must say that the belief that p is unconscious. 
And we suppose that A has deceived himself; here the uncon­
scious belief functions like an unconscious emotion: A says
that he believes that/feels p, but "really" he believes 
that/feels p.
Suppose that A (apparently sincerely) avows that he 
believes that p. (His avowal is subject to the same tests 
for credibility as his denial is, of course.) His avowal
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may be prefaced by hesitation; A may be wondering, "Do I be­
lieve that p?", and finally after thinking p through, de­
cides that he does. Or A's avowal may be immediate; here 
we would say that A's belief was "close to the surface" or 
easily "retrievable." When A's avowal that p is immediate, 
we are inclined to say that his belief that p is conscious, 
for it fulfills the condition that A be in a position to 
avow his awareness that p. But usually A would not be so 
immediately aware of his beliefs; A is aware of his beliefs 
only in situations where those particular beliefs are called 
into question or are likely to be (when A is testifying be­
fore the McCarthy committee, he is painfully aware of his 
conviction that one does not tattle on one's associates). 
Otherwise A's beliefs do not impinge upon his consciousness; 
usually he simply acts upon them without being aware of them. 
This is why I claim that, typically, beliefs— and motives, 
desires, and intentions— are unconscious.
Usually we think of thought, in the sense of rea­
soning, as being conscious, as when we think through or rea­
son through a problem. But also we have a concept of uncon­
scious thought that has to do with the "process" of reason-
9ing. We think of unconscious thinking or reasoning as 
being exactly like conscious thinking or reasoning, or 
working through a problem, except that we are unaware of the 
means— the succession of "thoughts"— used to get to the so­
lution, or end. I should like to say that thought, or
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reasoning, is, like emotions, neither typically conscious 
nor typically unconscious.
To sum up, I find that typically conscious states 
are those states that it is easy for us to distinguish and 
introspectively avow, for one or both of these reasons; 
either we cannot, at least typically, be unaware of them, 
or they are unlikely to generate self-deception. Generally, 
sensations and perceptions fulfill these conditions and are 
conscious. Typically unconscious states are those states 
that generally we are not aware of and so are not set to 
introspectively avow. Our beliefs, motives, desires, and 
intentions are conscious only when we have occasion to be 
aware of them; also, we often have reason not to be aware 
of them, so that in such cases, they are unconscious. Our 
"real" emotions, while immediately felt, sometimes are unac­
ceptable and so are disguised, in which case we misinterpret 
them, and they remain unconscious. Our thoughts typically 
are conscious, in that we think of a thought as verbal; but 
we can have unconscious "thoughts" that really are the work­
ings of unconscious processes of reasoning. Unconscious 
states differ from conscious states only in that we cannot 
introspectively report our unconscious states; and if a 
state is typically conscious or unconscious it is so in 
that it is characterized by the introspective report, or 
not.
NOTES
^Throughout the dissertation, I have talked of all 
sorts of mental "states," but of course it makes more sense 
to call some states "states" than others; nevertheless, I 
want to continue to ignore this consideration and to con­
tinue to use "state" in the widest possible way, to refer 
to any discrete or continuous conscious or unconscious (men­
tal) activity whatsoever. Second, I have used, e.g., "con­
scious state" and "conscious mental state" fairly inter­
changeably; this is a deliberately casual way of showing 
that I do not know where the border between, say, physical 
and mental sensation is: surely many states are both men­
tal and physical.
2This is similar to the telling of a dream: we fix
words upon the evanescent images and then, forever in our 
mind, those images are defined and frozen into the patterns 
given them by our words.
^Another example of the role speech plays in con­
scious states concerns articulateness. We all know that in 
a situation of stress in which we must perform verbally—  
say, in an oral examination— one way to get beyond the blank 
wall that our mind erects in response to an examiner's ques­
tion is, simply, to start talking: the words themselves
often eventually lead us to (our awareness of) what we need 
to say.
^See p. 92, fn. 14.
^Or perhaps instances of this particular case are 
very rare, so that the dictum "ladies do not feel such 
things" is literally true. How then, in such rare instances, 
is the woman to interpret her emotion? Here perhaps the dis­
honesty and obtuseness of self-deception— the moral judgments 
we make— are almost inapplicable.
good discussion of unconscious emotions is Michael 
Fox's "On Unconscious Emotions," Philosophy and Phenomenological
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Research (December 1973), pp. 151-170. Fox argues against 
two views of unconscious emotion: one view claims that an
unconscious emotion would be an unfelt feeling, an unexpe­
rienced experience, and thus is a contradiction; the other 
view holds that unconscious emotions exist, but only as 
dispositions for emotions that would be felt if the condi­
tions were right for them. Fox claims that an unconscious 
emotion is presently experienced, and is "unconscious not 
in the sense of being unsensed, unnoticed, unattended, or 
ignored, but in the sense of being unrecognized, uncommuni- 
cable, and unavailable to awareness." (p. 170)
^See Wittgenstein's remarks on belief in his Philo­
sophical Investigations, Nos. 574 and 578. Also see Dennett 
on the differences between having an opinion and having a 
belief (Brainstorms, pp. 300-309) . Having an opinion in 
some respects is like having a conscious mental state and 
having a belief in some respects is like having an uncon­
scious mental state. These respects correspond to the ways 
in which having a conscious state is something only language- 
users can have and the ways in which having an unconscious 
state is something both language-using and non-language- 
using animals can have.
gGenerally, this argument works also for motives, 
desires, and intentions.
gBertrand Russell mentions this in describing his 
writing methods: Russell says that he needs to give con­
centrated conscious attention to a problem, and then must 
let the subject incubate in his "subconsciousness," until 
the solution "emerge[s] with blinding clarity." "How I 
Write," Portraits From Memory (New York: A Clarion Book,
1969, pp. 210-214), pp. 211-212.
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